Clause Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making by Horton, David
HORTON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019 2:15 PM 
 
 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 68 APRIL 2019 NUMBER 7 
CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION: A GLIMPSE INTO 
JUDICIAL AND ARBITRAL DECISION-
MAKING 
DAVID HORTON† 
ABSTRACT 
  For decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that forcing a 
plaintiff to arbitrate—rather than allowing her to litigate—does not af-
fect the outcome of a dispute. Recently, the Court has invoked this “par-
ity assumption” to expand arbitral jurisdiction. Reasoning that it does 
not matter whether an arbitrator or a judge resolves a particular issue, 
the Justices have allowed arbitrators to decide important questions 
about the arbitral proceeding itself. 
  The parity assumption has proven impossible to test. First, cases that 
are arbitrated differ from those that end up in the judicial system, com-
plicating efforts to compare outcomes from each sphere. Second, arbi-
tral awards are rarely published and thus remain shrouded in mystery. 
  However, one important topic defies these limitations. Jurisdictions 
are divided over whether courts or arbitrators should perform a task 
known as “clause construction”—determining whether an arbitration 
clause that does not mention class actions permits such procedures. As 
a result, both judges and arbitrators have been weighing in on the same 
question. Moreover, because class members are entitled to notice of rul-
ings that impact their rights, the American Arbitration Association re-
quires arbitral clause-construction awards to be available to the public. 
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For once, then, it is possible to assess how the two kinds of deci-
sionmakers resolve the same issue. 
  This Article capitalizes on this opportunity by analyzing a dataset 
of 150 recent judicial and arbitral clause-construction decisions. Its 
logit regression analysis concludes that arbitrators are nearly 64 times 
more likely than judges to allow class actions. This Article then uses its 
findings to propose a solution to the circuit split over clause construc-
tion and to inform the broader debate over the boundaries between ju-
dicial and arbitral power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, a prison service provider called JPay faced two similar 
class actions.1 One accused the company of overcharging inmates and 
their loved ones for electronic money transfers.2 The other alleged that 
JPay’s “video visitation” sessions—a kind of Skype for the incarcer-
ated—were shorter than advertised.3 Yet, like countless other busi-
nesses, JPay had tried to protect itself from lawsuits by placing an ar-
bitration clause in its contract with customers.4 Thus, in each case, the 
 
 1. See Defendants’ Notice of Removal at 1–2, JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, No. 1:16-cv-20121-DPG 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Kobel Complaint]; Defendant’s Notice of Removal at 1–4, 
JPay, Inc. v. Salim, No. 1:16-cv-20107-DLG (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Salim Complaint].  
 2. See Kobel Complaint, supra note 1, at 1.  
 3. See Salim Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
 4. See JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, No. 16-20121-CIV-GAYLES/TURNOFF, 2017 WL 3218218, at 
*1 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2017) [hereinafter Kobel Order]; Salim Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
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first clash between the parties centered on whether the plaintiffs could 
go to court or instead needed to arbitrate. 
However, what happened next was like a chess game in reverse. 
Bucking the conventional wisdom, both groups of plaintiffs invoked 
JPay’s arbitration provision.5 Although arbitration has acquired a rep-
utation as “the place lawsuits go to die,”6 the consumers filed their class 
actions in the private forum.7 JPay responded by doing something 
equally unexpected; it tried to stop the arbitrations and remove the dis-
putes to court.8 In turn, this prompted the plaintiffs to file motions in 
court to compel arbitration of their own claims.9 
These backward-seeming tactics are the product of a doctrinal 
anomaly. In the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)10 in two major ways. The first relates 
to class actions. Starting with 2011’s AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion,11 the Court has instructed lower courts to uphold class-arbitration 
waivers in almost all circumstances, placing the burden on individuals 
to pursue low-value claims in numerous two-party arbitrations.12 The 
second strand of the Court’s recent FAA jurisprudence revolves 
around the mind-bending issue of arbitration about arbitration.13 Tra-
ditionally, judges have decided matters of “substantive arbitrability”—
that is, whether a dispute should be sent to arbitration because it falls 
within the scope of a valid arbitration clause.14 However, in a line of 
 
 5. See Kobel Order, supra note 4, at *1; Order, JPay, Inc. v. Salim, No. 16-20107-CV-1434l-
DLG, 2016 WL 9735069, at 2 (May 24, 2016) [hereinafter Salim Order].  
 6. Hawkins v. Region’s, 944 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (N.D. Miss. 2013). 
 7. See Kobel Order, supra note 4, at *1; Salim Order, supra note 5, at *3–4.  
 8. See Kobel Order, supra note 4, at *1; Salim Order, supra note 5, at *3–4. 
 9. See Kobel Order, supra note 4, at *1; Salim Order, supra note 5, at *3–4. 
 10. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–16 (2012)).  
 11. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 12. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (“In the Federal Arbitration 
Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their 
terms—including terms providing for individualized proceedings.”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 
136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (holding that the FAA preempts a California appellate court’s conclu-
sion that a class arbitration waiver did not apply to a particular dispute); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238 (2013) (extending Concepcion to cases involving federal 
statutory claims); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (prohibiting courts from deeming class-arbitration 
waivers to be unconscionable).  
 13. I address this phenomenon in David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 363 (2018). In that piece, I flag, but do not analyze, the jurisdictional split over clause con-
struction. See id. at 376 n.93.  
 14. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (“[A] gateway 
dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of 
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cases about arbitrating arbitrability, the Court has opened the door for 
arbitrators to resolve any conflict about the arbitration.15 As counter-
intuitive as it seems, the Court has held that “parties can agree to arbi-
trate ‘gateway’ questions[,] . . . such as whether the[y] have agreed to 
arbitrate” a particular claim.16 
These Supreme Court opinions are widely seen as a brutal one-
two punch to the plaintiffs’ bar. According to conventional wisdom, 
Concepcion and its progeny have sounded “the death knell for con-
sumer and employment class actions.”17 As scores of policymakers, 
scholars, and journalists have noted, few individuals spend the time and 
money necessary to arbitrate small grievances.18 Likewise, the Court’s 
 
[substantive] arbitrability’ for a court to decide.”). Unfortunately, the Court sometimes refers to 
issues of “substantive arbitrability” simply as issues “arbitrability,” and matters of “procedural 
arbitrability” as not involving “arbitrability.” See, e.g., id. at 83–84.  
 15. The Court announced that parties could empower the arbitrator to decide whether a 
dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining context. See 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960) (ex-
plaining that the party claiming arbitrability is “excluded from court determination” and “must 
bear the burden of a clear demonstration of that purpose”). Eventually, the Justices extended this 
principle to other settings. See Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 66 (2010) (enforc-
ing a provision in a freestanding arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee 
that delegated to the arbitrator exclusive authority “to resolve any dispute relating to the inter-
pretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement”); First Options of Chi., 
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995) (observing that parties to a commercial contract can 
“clearly agree[] to have the arbitrators decide (i.e., to arbitrate) the question of arbitrability”). 
 16. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68–69. 
 17. Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative 
Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 103, 116 (2015); see Aaron Blumenthal, 
Comment, Circumventing Concepcion: Conceptualizing Innovative Strategies to Ensure the En-
forcement of Consumer Protection Laws in the Age of the Inviolable Class Action Waiver, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 699, 701 (2015) (“The death knell of the consumer class action has sounded.”); 
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) (“All of the doctrinal developments of recent 
years circumscribing the reach of class actions pale in import next to the game-changing edict that 
companies . . . may simply opt out of potential liability by incorporating class action waiver lan-
guage in their standard form contracts . . . .”); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Ero-
sion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3054 (2015) (“A private entity, through contractual 
arbitration provisions, can now significantly reduce or even remove its substantive legal obliga-
tions by eliminating claiming.”); David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, 
and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1222 (2013) (“[C]iting Concepcion, judges are com-
pelling arbitration of claims that are destined to fail.”); see also Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness 
in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 118–33 (2011) (critiquing Concepcion).  
 18. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private 
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2814–15 (2015) (noting that “almost no 
consumers or employees ‘do’ arbitration at all”). In 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (“CFPB”) cited these concerns to ban class-arbitration waivers in financial-services con-
tracts. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 12 
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arbitrating-arbitrability decisions supposedly shield corporations from 
liability by permitting arbitrators to decide whether the plaintiff must 
arbitrate her complaint. After all, arbitrators bill by the hour, and they 
have a pecuniary interest in catering to the repeat-playing businesses 
that might choose them again.19 Thus, critics speculate that arbitrators 
are unlikely to exempt matters from arbitration.20 
However, on one vital issue, the two prongs of the Court’s case 
law collide. Although Concepcion mandates that courts enforce ex-
press class-arbitration waivers, it does not govern arbitration clauses 
that neither allow nor prohibit aggregate proceedings.21 In this com-
mon situation—when a provision is “silent” on the topic—somebody 
needs to engage in “clause construction” and decide whether class ac-
tions are permissible.22 And here the Justices’ disdain for class actions 
crashes headlong into their aggrandizement of arbitrators. Under the 
arbitrating-arbitrability opinions, there is a colorable argument that ar-
bitrators enjoy the right to interpret the arbitration clause.23 Moreover, 
when it comes to clause construction, arbitrators have financial incen-
tives that favor plaintiffs. If an arbitrator reads a silent arbitration pro-
vision to bar class actions, she is left with a single, small-dollar claim 
that will likely be abandoned. But if she goes the other way, she chris-
tens a lucrative multiparty dispute.24 
 
C.F.R. pt. 1040). Yet, in October 2017, the Senate voted 51 to 50—with Vice President Pence 
breaking the tie—to repeal the CFPB’s rule. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau 
Loses Fight to Allow More Class Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-wall-street-regulation.html?_r=0. [https://perma.cc/ 
H4AV-FSJL]. 
 19. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES r. 13, at 21, r. 44, at 30 (2009), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment
%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS5G-6AYF] (outlining arbitrator selection and compensation); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 685 (1996) (“An arbitrator who issues a large punitive 
damages award against a company may not get chosen again by that company or others who hear 
of the award.”). 
 20. See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 
246 (2012) (“If the arbitrator decides that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable, he loses 
income.”); cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that arbitrators should not be allowed to decide whether arbitration is war-
ranted because “[t]heir compensation corresponds to the volume of arbitration they perform”). 
 21. See, e.g., Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 448 (Ct. App. 2015) (noting that 
“Concepcion [is] irrelevant” if an arbitration clause “[does] not contain a class action waiver”).  
 22. See, e.g., Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
clause-construction process).  
 23. See infra Part I.A.  
 24. See Charles H. Brower II, Mind the Gap, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2016). 
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This dynamic explains the bizarre maneuvering in the class actions 
against JPay. Both sets of plaintiffs were desperately trying to obtain 
an arbitrator’s ruling on clause construction. Conversely, the defendant 
did everything in its power to obtain a decision from a judge on the 
matter. Ultimately, these intuitions were correct. In one lawsuit, a fed-
eral court in Florida engaged in clause construction itself, holding that 
the agreement precluded class actions.25 Within a week, a different 
judge in the same Florida district passed the baton to the arbitrator,26 
who concluded that the agreement authorized class procedures.27 
These incongruous results are part of a larger trend. The legal sys-
tem has been unable to clarify whether an arbitration clause that does 
not mention class actions allows such procedures.28 In fact, as the JPay 
cases illustrate, judges are now disagreeing about an even more ele-
mentary question: Should courts or arbitrators perform clause con-
struction? 
This Article uses this split in authority as an opportunity. For dec-
ades, there has been a raging debate about whether being forced to 
arbitrate affects the outcome of a dispute.29 As noted above, some ob-
 
 25. See JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, No. 16-20121-CIV-GAYLES/TURNOFF, 2016 WL 2853537, at 
*4 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2016); Kobel Order, supra note 4, at *5. As this Article was being edited, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. See JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923, 
931, 936 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that “that the availability of class arbitration is . . . presump-
tively for the courts to decide,” but that the parties had delegated the question to the arbitrator). 
 26. See Salim Order, supra note 5, at 4. But see Kobel Order, supra note 4, at *5 (“This Court 
respectfully disagrees with, and is not bound by, the Salim Ruling.”). 
 27. See Opinion, Order and Award on Clause Construction at 15–16, Salim v. JPay, Inc., 
Case No. 01-15-005-8277 (Am. Arb. Ass’n 2016) (Hochberg, Harding & Dreier, Arbs.). 
 28. In fact, as this Article was being edited, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case 
in which lower courts had determined that a silent arbitration clause permitted class actions. See 
Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1697 
(2018). I address Lamps Plus infra notes 280, 287. 
 29. Compare Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 
1986) (contending that “the arbitration system is an inferior system of justice, structured without 
due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law”), and Paul D. Car-
rington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 332 (arguing that 
enforcing arbitration clauses “weaken[s] enforcement of the national law”), with Samuel Estrei-
cher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 
1353 (1997) (“[A]rbitration involves a change in the forum only—from the courts to a jointly 
selected neutral decisionmaker. It does not involve the waiver of substantive rights.”) and Chris-
topher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 769 (arguing that 
arbitration institutions like the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) have incentives to 
ensure that the process is fair).  
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servers believe that arbitration’s informal rules and paid decisionmak-
ers tilt the scales of justice toward businesses.30 Yet, as a matter of Su-
preme Court precedent, arbitration and litigation are equally hospita-
ble forums for plaintiffs. Indeed, more than 30 years ago, the Court 
announced that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate[,] . . . a party does not forgo 
[any] substantive rights.”31 This view, which I call the “parity assump-
tion,” is a pillar of contemporary arbitration law.32 The Court has re-
peated it like a mantra,33 and lower courts have cited it more than 600 
times.34 
The parity assumption is hard to disprove. For one, arbitration is 
private dispute resolution—a “black box[,] . . . where the proceedings 
are confidential and non-precedential.”35 Unlike judicial opinions, 
which are available to the public, arbitral awards do not have to be rea-
soned or written.36 Thus, even if one could obtain arbitration results, 
one could only guess at how an arbitrator arrived at a particular hold-
ing.37 Compounding this problem, it is not necessarily instructive to 
 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20.  
 31. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 32. An earlier draft of this Article used the phrase “parity principle.” However, Professor 
Luke P. Norris then published a thought-provoking article entitled The Parity Principle, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 249 (2018). Norris’s “parity principle” is completely different than mine: it refers 
to his argument that section 1, which exempts certain contracts from the FAA, reveals that Con-
gress did not intend the statute to apply “where wide economic power disparities exist between 
parties.” Id. at 253 (emphasis added). To minimize confusion, I changed “parity principle” to 
“parity assumption.”  
 33. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 (2009); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 
359 (2008); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123–24 (2001); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229–30 
(1987). 
 34. A Westlaw search in the “all cases” database on February 16, 2019, for “adv: arbitrat! /10 
forgo /10 ‘substantive rights’” yielded 675 results.  
 35. Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 371, 409; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Niel-
sen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 323, 422 (2011) (observing that it is notoriously difficult to “obtain[] sufficient reliable data 
on largely private arbitration processes”). 
 36. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 
(1960) (“Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.”); Pat K. 
Chew, Arbitral and Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or Justice Denied?, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 185, 200 (2011) (“[A]rbitrators do not always write opinions. They are not legally 
required to do so, and the parties may not want or need them.”). The AAA once discouraged 
arbitrators from memorializing awards in writing in order to insulate them from judicial review. 
See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 857 (1961).  
 37. See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Prece-
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compare arbitration outcomes with those from the judicial system. Be-
cause complaints that are arbitrated diverge from those that are liti-
gated, any discrepancy in win rates might actually reflect variations in 
the strength of the underlying cases.38 For these reasons, “research into 
the fairness of mandatory arbitration ha[s] produced only a handful of 
empirical studies, and these have told us very little.”39 
But clause construction is different. Because class members are 
entitled to notice of proceedings that impact their rights, the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) treats clause-construction orders as 
sui generis. For one, the AAA requires arbitrators to memorialize their 
clause-construction reasoning in writing.40 Also, rather than shielding 
awards from disclosure, the AAA publishes all clause-construction rul-
ings on its website.41 Moreover, these awards showcase how courts and 
 
dent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2012) (“[W]e know very little about how arbitrators be-
have . . . .”).  
 38. See infra Part II.A.  
 39. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 
1283 (2009); see also David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for 
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2005) 
(observing that both “critics and advocates” of arbitration make “assertions that [are] generally 
devoid of empirical support”). The empirical work that does exist falls into three camps. First, 
some articles compare arbitration results with other arbitration results. See, e.g., Andrea Cann 
Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2019)  (examining whether defendants and plaintiffs’ law firms that arbitrate multiple 
times outperform their one-shot counterparts); Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 
(2011) (same); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 111 (2015) (same) [hereinafter Horton & Chan-
drasekher, After the Revolution]; David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment 
Arbitration After the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (2016) (same); cf. Stephen J. Choi, Jill 
E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 128–40 (2010) (ex-
amining factors that influence awards in securities arbitration). Second, other scholars use awards 
to gain a better understanding of how arbitrators decide cases. See Weidemaier, supra note 37, at 
1111–30 (surveying citation practices in three samples of arbitral rulings). Third, commentators 
have compared the results of psychological tests that were given to both judges and arbitrators. 
See Susan D. Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator’s Mind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1166 (2017) (finding 
that “international arbitrators performed at least as well as, but never demonstrably worse than, 
judges”).  
 40. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS r. 3, at 3 
(2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20
Arbitrations.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW8R-YTGJ] (“[T]he arbitrator shall determine as a thresh-
old matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether 
the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a 
class.”). 
 41. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, CLASS ACTION CASE DOCKET, https://bit.ly/2GJuZgS 
[https://perma.cc/KPE9-EHDL]. Researchers have taken advantage of the accessibility of clause-
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arbitrators see the exact same issue. Indeed, as different jurisdictions—
and different courts within the same jurisdiction—have splintered over 
who should interpret the arbitration clause, the task of clause construc-
tion has been, in effect, randomly dealt to judges and arbitrators across 
the country. 
To capitalize on this rare window into the decision-making pro-
cess, this Article studies 150 clause-construction orders issued by courts 
and arbitrators between June 1, 2010, and February 15, 2019. Its results 
are striking. For most judges, clause construction is simple to the point 
of being banal. If an arbitration clause does not explicitly permit class 
actions, it bans them. Indeed, just 2 of the 44 courts in my data (4.5 
percent) interpreted a silent arbitration clause to authorize class 
claims. In sharp contrast, 58 of the 106 arbitrators (54.7 percent) 
smashed a champagne bottle across the hull of a class action, silent 
clause notwithstanding. Likewise, this Article’s logit regression analy-
sis—which estimates the effect of several variables on clause-construc-
tion rulings while holding other factors constant—reveals that the odds 
of class actions being allowed are 63.7 times higher simply because the 
issue is arbitrated. 
This Article then uses this evidence to reexamine the line between 
judicial and arbitral power. The Court has used three factors to deter-
mine which decisionmaker should resolve issues related to the arbitra-
tion.42 At various times, the Justices have considered (1) the need to 
streamline dispute resolution, (2) the relative expertise of courts and 
arbitrators, and (3) the parties’ intent.43 Under the parity assumption, 
one factor that cannot affect the analysis is mere conjecture “that an 
arbitrator will . . . be driven by an ulterior interest in keeping the case 
 
construction awards. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Pro-
cedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1154 (2011) (examining arbitrators’ reasoning in a random sam-
ple of 24 clause-construction awards); Alyssa S. King, Too Much Power and Not Enough: Arbi-
trators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031 (2017) (analyzing 64 clause-
construction awards to track trends in outcomes over time); Weidemaier, supra note 37, at 1115, 
1127–28 (analyzing arbitrator citation practices in a dataset that includes 97 clause-construction 
awards); Alan Scott Rau, “Gap Filling” by Arbitrators 62–63 (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Ctr. 
for Glob. Energy, Int’l Arbitration and Envtl. Law, Research Paper No. 2014-03, 2014), https:// 
repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/28755/2014_06_Gap-Filling-by-Arbitra-
tors.pdf?sequence=2 [https://perma.cc/64E3-QZCF] (criticizing arbitrators’ logic in 22 clause-
construction rulings).  
 42. See infra Part I.A. 
 43. See id. 
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in arbitration to generate fees.”44 Nevertheless, the studied clause-con-
struction rulings suggest that arbitral bias is real, not just theoretical. 
Thus, this Article proposes that the arbitrability equation should also 
consider that certain issues create opportunities for arbitrators to warp 
their rulings in furtherance of their financial self-interest. 
This Article contains three parts. Part I provides background 
about clause construction. It traces the issue to the expansion of arbi-
tration about arbitration and the Court’s use of the FAA to curtail class 
actions. Part II describes how I gathered and analyzed my data. It then 
establishes that, at least in the AAA, the only variable with a statisti-
cally significant effect on the outcome of clause construction is whether 
a judge or an arbitrator decides the matter. Part III uses this data to 
draw descriptive and normative conclusions about arbitral power. 
I.  CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION 
This Part describes the two hallmarks of the Supreme Court’s 
modern FAA jurisprudence. First, the Justices have allowed arbitra-
tors to make pivotal decisions about the dispute-resolution process. 
Second, the Court has encouraged companies to use arbitration as a 
defense against class actions. This Part then examines clause construc-
tion—the hotly contested intersection of these trends. 
A. Arbitration About Arbitration 
Suppose two parties have a dispute about arbitration. A plaintiff 
might contend that she never even assented to a contract that contains 
an arbitration provision. Alternatively, she might concede that she 
agreed to arbitrate some claims but assert that the arbitration clause is 
narrow and does not encompass this particular claim. Finally, the par-
ties could disagree about whether the plaintiff’s complaint is timely or 
whether the defendant is barred from compelling arbitration under the 
doctrines of waiver, laches, or estoppel. These skirmishes raise the 
same vexing question: Should a court or an arbitrator resolve them? 
This Section explains that this issue, which is known as “arbitrability,” 
has long been unsettled. But although the precise contours of the 
black-letter law may be elusive, the general trend is not—the Court has 
gradually given arbitrators greater power to decide gateway questions 
about the arbitration itself. 
 
 44. Phillips v. Bestway Rental, Inc., No. 4:12CV48, 2013 WL 832306, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 
Mar. 6, 2013), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
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The story begins in 1925, when Congress passed the FAA.45 Under 
the ancient ouster and revocability doctrines, courts refused to grant 
specific performance of an arbitration provision.46 The FAA elimi-
nated these antiarbitration principles through its centerpiece, section 
2, which makes agreements to arbitrate “valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”47 By doing so, the statute puts arbitration 
clauses “upon the same footing as other contracts.”48 
In addition, the FAA allocates power between courts and arbitra-
tors. On the front end, sections 3 and 4 task judges with ensuring that 
arbitration is warranted.49 They require a court to be “satisfied” that a 
lawsuit is “referable to arbitration”50 and that there is no conflict about 
“the making of the arbitration agreement.”51 On the back end, section 
10 permits courts to overrule an arbitrator’s award for extreme de-
fects.52 To preserve arbitration’s expediency, judges must confirm an 
arbitrator’s ruling unless it is tainted by “corruption,” “fraud,” or “par-
tiality,”53 or the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” by addressing an 
issue that the parties did not submit to arbitration.54 This makes judicial 
review of arbitration awards “extremely deferential.”55 
For decades, arbitration was seen as a pale substitute for litigation. 
Even the FAA’s draftsman, Julius Henry Cohen, cautioned that arbi-
tration was “not the proper method for deciding points of law of major 
importance.”56 Likewise, in Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court held 
that Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to resolve federal statutory 
 
 45. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–16 (2012)). 
 46. See Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532 (K.B.); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. 
Rep. 595, 597 (K.B.). 
 47. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 49. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4.  
 50. Id. § 3.  
 51. Id. § 4.  
 52. Id. § 10.  
 53. Id. § 10(a)(1)–(3).  
 54. Id. § 10(a)(4).  
 55. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 56. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. 
REV. 265, 281 (1926) (explaining that the process is “peculiarly suited to the disposition of the 
ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, 
compliance with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like”).  
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claims outside of the court system.57 The Court reached this conclusion, 
in part, by reasoning that judges are superior to arbitrators: 
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge 
of an alleged violator of the [Securities] Act [of 1933]. They must be 
not only determined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial 
instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explana-
tion of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceed-
ings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning of such statutory 
requirements as “burden of proof,” “reasonable care” or “material 
fact,” . . . cannot be examined.58 
However, as the decades passed, the lines that Congress had 
drawn between judges and arbitrators began to blur. One recurring 
problem arose from the fact that contracts usually contain broad arbi-
tration clauses, such as: “Any controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this [a]greement [must] be settled by arbitration . . . .”59 
When the parties cast such a wide net, which decisionmaker has juris-
diction to rule on arbitrability? That is, who should answer the gateway 
question of whether a claim is even subject to arbitration? On the one 
hand, these are controversies or claims that flow from the contract and 
fall squarely within the ambit of the arbitration provision. This suggests 
that the parties had agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. On the other hand, 
it seems perverse to allow arbitrators to decide the very question of 
whether arbitration is proper.60 
 
 57. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 58. Id. at 435–36; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (reason-
ing that “the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding” and 
“[t]he record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete [and] the usual rules of evidence 
do not apply”). 
 59. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1960).  
 60. A related dilemma occurred when a party contended that the contract that included the 
arbitration clause (the “container contract”) had been obtained through fraud or duress. Argua-
bly, this was a question for arbitrators. Indeed, the parties had agreed to arbitrate all disputes 
between them, and the validity of the container contract was one such dispute. Yet, if the arbitra-
tor voided the container contract, she “would destroy [her] . . . authority to decide anything and 
thus make [her] decision a nullity.” Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 
978, 986 (2d Cir. 1942). The Court eventually resolved this paradox in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Manufacturing Co. by announcing the separability doctrine. 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967). 
Under this principle, “arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are ‘separable’ from the con-
tracts in which they are embedded.” Id. Separability is the legal fiction that every agreement that 
includes an arbitration provision is actually two agreements: (1) the agreement to arbitrate, and 
(2) the broader container contract. See id. This bifurcated structure permits arbitrators to strike 
down the container contract without simultaneously foreclosing their own ability to make such a 
ruling.  
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The Court has suggested various answers to the arbitrability puz-
zle. It first tackled the issue in 1964, with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Livingston.61 A union entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) with Interscience, a publishing firm.62 The CBA gave em-
ployees seniority and pension rights and also established a multistep 
dispute-resolution process in which the union could only initiate arbi-
tration after it had tried to negotiate with the employer.63 John Wiley 
& Sons acquired Interscience and refused to provide the benefits that 
its predecessor had granted.64 The union protested by filing an arbitra-
tion, but Wiley countered that it could not be compelled to arbitrate 
because (1) it had never signed the CBA, and (2) alternatively, the un-
ion had failed to meet and confer before filing its grievance.65 
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, attempted to solve the 
problem by dividing arbitrability into two camps.66 First, he explained, 
there are matters of substantive arbitrability, which judges—not arbi-
trators—must resolve.67 Substantive arbitrability arises when a party 
argues that it never manifested assent to an agreement that includes an 
arbitration clause.68 As Justice Harlan explained, because arbitration 
draws its legitimacy from the parties’ consent, permitting an arbitrator 
to determine whether a party had consented would be premature.69 Un-
der this rubric, Wiley’s assertion that it had not agreed to the CBA 
raised a matter of substantive arbitrability.70 Indeed, the Court held, 
because “[t]he duty to arbitrate” is wholly “contractual,” a court must 
“determin[e] that the [CBA] does in fact create such a duty.”71 
 
 61. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Wiley did not involve the 
FAA; rather, it arose under section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which 
governs collective bargaining agreements. See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub L. No. 80-
101, § 301, 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012)).  
 62. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 544–45. 
 63. Id. at 545, 556–57.  
 64. Id. at 545. 
 65. Id. at 545, 556–57. 
 66. Id. at 547–59. 
 67. Id. at 545–47. Lower courts had previously used this term loosely to signify “the question 
of arbitrability of the subject matter.” Brass & Copper Workers Fed. Labor Union No. 19322 v. 
Am. Brass Co., 172 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1959), aff’d, 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959).  
 68. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 558.  
 69. Id. at 546–47.  
 70. Id. at 547. 
 71. Id.  
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Second, Justice Harlan explained that questions involving proce-
dural arbitrability are for arbitrators.72 Justice Harlan applied this label 
to Wiley’s assertion that the union had failed to exhaust the steps nec-
essary to arbitrate.73 Justice Harlan reached this result by noting that 
the evidence necessary to resolve the arbitrability issue overlapped 
with the evidence that pertained to the merits of the union’s complaint: 
Questions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do 
not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dis-
pute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered 
by it. In this case, for example, the Union argues that Wiley’s con-
sistent refusal to recognize the [CBA] . . . made it “utterly futile—and 
a little bit ridiculous to follow the grievance steps as set forth in the 
contract.” . . . These arguments in response to Wiley’s “procedural” 
claim are meaningless unless set in the background of the merger and 
the negotiations surrounding it.74 
Thus, Justice Harlan reasoned that it would be more economical 
to allow the arbitrator to entertain both claims.75 I refer to this view—
which allocates power between judges and arbitrators with an eye to 
abbreviating the dispute-resolution process—as the efficiency theory of 
arbitrability. 
Unfortunately, Wiley created more questions than it answered. 
The Court’s logic for assigning procedural arbitrability to arbitrators—
that the same evidence pertained to the arbitrability of the grievance 
and to the actual grievance76—also applies to matters of substantive ar-
bitrability. Wiley itself is a shining example of this phenomenon. The 
Court held that judges, not arbitrators, should assess whether the 
CBA’s arbitration clause had survived the merger and therefore gov-
erned Wiley.77 But whether the CBA had survived the merger was also 
the fulcrum of the underlying complaint. Indeed, if Wiley was not 
 
 72. Id. at 555. The phrase “procedural arbitrability” was not new. See Carey v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 213 F. Supp. 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963) (defining “pro-
cedural arbitrability” to mean “objections to arbitration on the ground that the party seeking to 
compel it has failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the grievance and arbitration 
provisions”). 
 73. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 556–59. 
 74. Id. at 556–57. 
 75. See id. at 558 (claiming that failing to allow the arbitrator to decide the two claims would 
result in a delay that “may entirely eliminate the prospect of a speedy arbitrated settlement of the 
dispute, to the disadvantage of the parties . . . and contrary to the aims of national labor policy”). 
 76. See id. at 556–58. 
 77. See id. at 547–48. 
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bound by the CBA, then it did not need to honor the concessions that 
Interscience had made in the agreement. Accordingly, because sub-
stantive and procedural arbitrability can bleed into the merits, the dis-
tinction between the two remains unclear. 
Commentators have tried to fill this gap. Some assert that the di-
vision between judicial and arbitral authority should revolve around 
the parties’ wishes.78 Arguably, matters of substantive arbitrability—
such as whether a party had manifested assent to the contract that in-
cluded the arbitration clause—are crucial.79 To minimize the risk of er-
ror, plaintiffs and defendants likely prefer to litigate these topics using 
traditional judicial procedures and appellate review.80 Conversely, the 
parties likely would not object to arbitrating mere procedural issues 
because the stakes are lower.81 I refer to the idea that issues should be 
assigned to judges or arbitrators “based on their importance to the par-
ties” as the intent theory of arbitrability.82 
Another proposal revolves around the fact that arbitrators are 
steeped in the norms of a particular industry.83 Thus, the argument pro-
ceeds, specialist arbitrators are better than generalist judges at evalu-
ating the interactions between the parties that underlie disputes about 
procedural arbitrability.84 Perhaps, then, Wiley’s rule “that procedural 
compliance was an issue for the arbitrator implicitly relied upon the 
presumed special competence of the arbitrator to make this type of de-
cision.”85 I refer to this as the expertise theory of arbitrability. 
 
 78. See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Government Regulation, 78 HARV. L. REV. 266, 
287 (1964) (noting that the most likely explanation for the division is that “various questions are 
arranged on a spectrum depending in large part on their importance to the parties”). 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. (“The procedural issue can be assigned to an arbitrator because it would seem a 
less serious imposition . . . to arbitrate when procedural prerequisites have not been met than to 
compel arbitration of an issue that he asserts he never agreed to arbitrate at all.”). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Comment, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the 
LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1459, 1468–71 (1964). 
 84. See Phila. Dress Joint Bd. of the Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Sidele Fash-
ions, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (“[T]he grievance procedure concerns the everyday 
relationships of management and labor and is part of the contract which would benefit from in-
terpretation by the arbitrator, who has specialized knowledge in the field.”). 
 85. Schwartz, supra note 83, at 1468; see also Carey v. Gen. Elec. Co., 213 F. Supp. 276, 284 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963) (observing that “judges should defer to 
arbitrators on matters over which the latter possess special competence”); Note, Procedural Re-
quirements of a Grievance Arbitration Clause: Another Question of Arbitrability, 70 YALE L.J. 
611, 618 (1961) (arguing that the line between substantive and procedural arbitrability should 
take into account the fact that “by virtue of his acquaintance with the industry and shop practices 
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The conflict between these views came to the fore with “scope ar-
bitrability”—the question whether an arbitration clause is broad 
enough to cover a particular claim.86 At first blush, scope arbitrability 
seems to belong to the substantive arbitrability family. Indeed, there is 
little difference between objecting, “I never agreed to arbitrate any 
cause of action,” and contending, “I never agreed to arbitrate this cause 
of action.”87 Yet, there are also powerful arguments that arbitrators 
should interpret the agreement to arbitrate. For one, Wiley’s efficiency 
theory suggests that disputes over the meaning of the arbitration clause 
are matters of procedural arbitrability because they usually overlap 
with the underlying merits. For example, in breach of contract cases, 
the parties’ negotiations shed light on the arbitrability of the merits and 
on the merits themselves.88 Similarly, the expertise rationale fits ques-
tions of scope arbitrability like a glove. Arbitrators are nothing less 
than “the parties’ officially designated ‘reader’ of the contract.”89 One 
of their greatest assets is their “familiarity with the vocabulary and cus-
toms of the industry”—skills that come to the fore when there is con-
flict over the meaning of the agreement.90 
Because scope arbitrability has a foot in both worlds, it is a hybrid. 
Like matters of substantive arbitrability, it is generally “an issue for 
judicial determination.”91 However, the Court cast a judge’s jurisdic-
tion over these issues as a mere presumption that the parties could 
override by “clearly and unmistakably” permitting an arbitrator to de-
 
constituting the environment in which the collective agreement was drawn up, the arbitrator is 
better qualified to settle disputes arising under the agreement”). 
 86. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 95 Civ. 2142 (LAP), 1996 WL 137587, 
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996).  
 87. Cf. George Bermann & Alan Scott Rau, Gateway-Schmateway: An Exchange Between 
George Bermann and Alan Rau, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 475 (2016) (“[I]t is one thing to say, ‘I never 
agreed to arbitrate,’ and it is another to say, ‘Well, I did agree to arbitrate, but I didn’t agree to 
arbitrate that.’”). 
 88. See Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1509 
(1959) (“The evidence bearing upon questions of arbitrability is often relevant to the merits.”). 
 89. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local Union No. 7001, 588 F.2d 
127, 128 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration 
Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 
(1977)).  
 90. Recent Case, Arbitration and Award—Arbitrators and Proceedings—By Considering 
Trade Usage Arbitrator Exceeded Authority to Interpret Contract Which Reviewing Court Finds 
Unambiguous, 63 HARV. L. REV. 347, 348 (1949).  
 91. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 
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cide whether a lawsuit falls within the ambit of the agreement to arbi-
trate.92 
In the 1980s, the lack of guidance from the Court about arbitrabil-
ity became a pressing problem. In a series of controversial opinions, 
the Court expanded the FAA.93 For example, the Court overruled 
Wilko’s prohibition on the arbitration of federal statutory claims and 
began to order plaintiffs to vindicate important rights outside of the 
judicial system.94 In doing so, the Court announced the parity assump-
tion, decreeing that the choice between arbitration and litigation does 
not affect the result of a case: 
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their res-
olution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the pro-
cedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplic-
ity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.95 
The parity assumption operates as a force field around arbitration 
agreements. For example, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,96 
the plaintiff sued his former employer, a securities firm, for age dis-
crimination.97 He argued that he could not receive a fair hearing be-
cause a New York Stock Exchange rule required that any arbitrators 
used by the firm be affiliated with the securities industry.98 The Court 
 
 92. Id.; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
583 n.7 (1960) (“Where the assertion . . . is that the parties excluded from court determination not 
merely the decision of the merits of the grievance but also the question of its arbitrability, . . . the 
claimant must bear the burden of a clear demonstration of that purpose.”). In addition, lower 
courts carved out a unique exception to scope arbitrability. Even when the “clear and unmistak-
able” test was met, some judges refused to allow arbitrators to exercise jurisdiction when a “claim 
of [scope] arbitrability [was] wholly groundless.” McCarroll v. L.A. Cty. Dist. Council of Carpen-
ters, 315 P.2d 322, 333 (Cal. 1957). However, the Court recently held that the wholly groundless 
exception violates the FAA. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 
528 (2019); see also infra notes 323, 339.  
 93. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (holding that the 
FAA applies to the maximum extent permissible under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (holding that the FAA governs in state court 
and preempts state law). 
 94. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (“The 
Court’s characterization of the arbitration process in Wilko is pervaded by . . . ‘the old judicial 
hostility to arbitration.’” (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942))). 
 95. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 96. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 97. Id. at 23–24. 
 98. Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 16, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., No. 
90-18, 1990 WL 10008999, at *16 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1990) (“A panel of industry arbitrators means 
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disagreed with the plaintiff, refusing to “presum[e] that the parties and 
arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to 
retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”99 Similarly, 
the parity assumption led the Court to hold that the FAA preempts 
any state rule that operates from the logic that arbitration is inferior to 
litigation. For example, California exempted workers with wage dis-
putes from arbitration,100 and Montana required arbitration clauses to 
be conspicuous.101 The FAA overrides these laws because they 
“singl[ed] out arbitration . . . for suspect status.”102 
This alleged equivalence between arbitration and litigation has 
provoked fierce debate. Academics object that the Court made a bold 
empirical claim with no evidence to support it.103 Because “service as 
an arbitrator requires no legal training,”104 they speculate that “arbitra-
tors may be ‘wholly unqualified to decide legal issues.’”105 Finally, they 
argue that arbitration is slanted toward the powerful enterprises that 
routinely use it. Unlike judges, arbitrators bill by the hour, which 
means that their livelihoods depend on appeasing the frequently arbi-
trating businesses that might select or veto them in the future.106 But 
 
that a discrimination claimant is not assured an unbiased hearing.”).  
 99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634). 
 100. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (2018), invalidated by Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 
(1987).  
 101. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (2017), invalidated by Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  
 102. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
 103. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 19, at 673 (“[T]he Court has not based th[is] assertion[] 
on any empirical data. Rather, the Court has simply announced its own opinion that arbitrators 
are as capable as judges and thereby shifted the burden to a party seeking to demonstrate the 
inferiority of arbitration.”).  
 104. Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: 
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 844 
(2003).  
 105. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 29, at 344–45 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J. dissenting)).  
 106. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60–61 
(“[A]rbitrators have an economic stake in being selected again, and their judgment may well be 
shaded by a desire to build a ‘track record’ of decisions that corporate repeat-users will view ap-
provingly.”); Sternlight, supra note 19, at 685 (“[A]rbitrators may be consciously or unconsciously 
influenced by the fact that the company, rather than the consumer, is a potential source of repeat 
business.”). 
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arbitration’s proponents have counterpunched. They defend arbitra-
tors, noting that they are often “retired judges or retired longstanding 
practitioners with a deep understanding of . . . [the] law.”107 
Meanwhile, arbitration has spread throughout the economy, mak-
ing the boundary between judges and arbitrators a kind of demilita-
rized zone. Companies added arbitration clauses to contracts for goods, 
services, employment, and medical care.108 Some went further by slash-
ing remedies109 and shifting costs to plaintiffs.110 Judges pushed back by 
repeatedly striking down one-sided arbitration clauses under the con-
tract law defense of unconscionability.111 They were able to do so be-
cause unconscionability—which centers on whether a party’s apparent 
“agreement” to fine print is authentic—is considered a matter of sub-
stantive arbitrability.112 
However, in 1995, the Court opened the door for companies to 
end-run this layer of judicial review in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan.113 Manuel Kaplan owned a firm called MKI.114 Manuel, along 
with his wife and MKI, entered into four contracts with First Options.115 
Only one contract featured an arbitration clause, and it had been 
signed by MKI, but not by the Kaplans.116 First Options initiated arbi-
tration against the Kaplans as individuals and against MKI.117 MKI 
 
 107. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Pro-
grams Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudica-
tion, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 29 (2003); see also John R. Allison, Arbitration Agree-
ments and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public 
Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 245 (1986) (“There is no good reason that lawyers with antitrust 
expertise, retired judges, industrial organization economists, or others with relevant back-
grounds could not be used as arbitrators in cases involving antitrust claims.”).  
 108. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1429 (2008) (noting that arbi-
tration practices grew significantly in the 1980s).  
 109. See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 143 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 110. See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 111. See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 388 (2012). 
 112. See Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (“This is a question 
of [substantive] arbitrability for the court to resolve . . . .”); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 582, 609, 613–14 (D.S.C. 1998), aff’d and remanded, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Wiley 
v. Advance Am., No. 3:07–3533–TLW–TER, 2008 WL 4179652, at *10 (D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2008) 
(“Whether the agreements to arbitrate are unconscionable . . . are issues of substantive arbitra-
bility . . . .”).  
 113. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 114. See id. at 940. 
 115. See id.  
 116. See id.  
 117. See id.  
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agreed to arbitrate, but the Kaplans argued to the arbitrators that they 
had never agreed to arbitrate any dispute with First Options.118 The ar-
bitrators rejected the Kaplans’s objections to their jurisdiction and then 
found for First Options on the merits.119 
The Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard that courts 
should apply when reviewing an arbitrator’s determination that a dis-
pute is arbitrable.120 In a unanimous decision written by Justice Breyer, 
the Court held that the answer to this question hinges on the parties’ 
intent.121 If the parties “agree[d] to submit the arbitrability question it-
self to arbitration,” then a judge should give the arbitrators’ resolution 
of that issue the same broad deference given to arbitral awards on the 
merits under section 10 of the FAA.122 Conversely, if “the parties did 
not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then 
the court should decide that question just as it would decide any other 
question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely, inde-
pendently.”123 
The Court then turned its attention to the next step in the analy-
sis—how courts should decide whether the parties intended to arbitrate 
the very question of whether they have agreed to arbitrate the merits 
of a complaint.124 Citing its previous decisions about scope arbitrability, 
the Court announced that judges “should not assume that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate [substantive] arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”125 The Court reasoned that 
this presumption against finding an intent to arbitrate matters about 
arbitration itself stems from the fact that arbitrating arbitrability “is ra-
ther arcane.”126 Indeed, “[a] party often might not focus upon that 
question or upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope 
of their own powers.”127 Finally, the Court applied the clear-and-un-
mistakable standard to the facts of the case. It held that First Options 
had not demonstrated that the Kaplans had unequivocally agreed to 
arbitrate the issue of whether they had agreed to arbitrate the merits 
 
 118. See id. at 941. 
 119. See id.  
 120. See id. at 942. 
 121. See id. at 943. 
 122. See id.  
 123. See id. (emphasis added).  
 124. See id. at 944.  
 125. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 126. Id. at 945. 
 127. Id. 
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of the lawsuit.128 Indeed, only MKI—not the Kaplans in their individual 
capacities—had even signed a contract that included an arbitration 
provision.129 Also, although the Kaplans had appeared in the arbitra-
tion, they did so for one purpose only: to vigorously protest the arbi-
trators’ assertion of power over them.130 
First Options is notable for two reasons. For one, it retreated from 
Wiley’s efficiency theory of arbitrability. Indeed, the Court did not ask 
whether the arbitrability issue and the underlying complaint involved 
the same facts. Instead, conferring substantive arbitrability to courts 
was justified on the grounds that arbitrating whether a party agreed to 
arbitrate a claim would “force . . . [the party] to arbitrate a matter they 
reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would de-
cide.”131 Thus, First Options suggests that the parties’ expectations 
should be paramount in distinguishing substantive and procedural ar-
bitrability. As such, it embraced the intent theory of arbitrability.132 
Even more importantly, First Options extended the clear-and-un-
mistakable principle from the context of scope arbitrability to all ques-
tions of substantive arbitrability. The rule once only governed disputes 
about the coverage of the arbitration clause.133 But now, a carefully 
drafted contract could ask arbitrators to decide the very question of 
whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate the merits of the case. 
Companies saw an opportunity after First Options to cut courts 
out of the loop. Fed up with what they saw as stifling judicial regulation, 
they began to use “delegation clauses” to allow arbitrators to resolve 
any dispute relating to the arbitration.134 Initially, most courts refused 
to permit arbitrators to decide whether the agreement to arbitrate the 
merits of the lawsuit was unconscionable. For example, in Ontiveros v. 
DHL Express (USA), Inc.,135 the California Court of Appeals found 
that the delegation clause itself is unconscionable under those circum-
 
 128. See id. at 946. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id.  
 131. Id. at 945. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 78–82.  
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 86–92.  
 134. See Horton, supra note 13, at 393.  
 135. Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Ct. App. 2008), abrogated 
by Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621 (Ct. App. 2014), and Malone v. Superior 
Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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stances, reasoning that “the arbitrator has a unique self-interest in de-
ciding that a dispute is arbitrable.”136 Likewise, a federal district court 
in Washington held that delegation clauses are “contrary to fundamen-
tal notions of fairness and basic principles of contract formation.”137 
However, in 2010, the Court threw its weight behind delegation 
clauses in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.138 Rent-A-Center, a 
rent-to-own company, required its employees to sign an arbitration 
agreement that gives an arbitrator the “exclusive authority to resolve 
any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability 
or formation of this [arbitration] Agreement including, but not limited 
to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voida-
ble.”139 Antonio Jackson, a former Rent-A-Center employee, sued the 
business for race discrimination.140 When Rent-A-Center moved to 
compel arbitration, Jackson argued that the arbitration clause was un-
conscionable.141 The Ninth Circuit held that Jackson could pursue his 
unconscionability theory in federal district court, rather than through 
arbitration, because any arbitration clause that might be unconsciona-
ble cannot pass the clear-and-unmistakable test from First Options.142 
According to the appellate panel, this was because an allegation of un-
conscionability translates into a claim that a party “did not meaning-
fully assent to the [a]greement.”143 
The Supreme Court reversed.144 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
began by describing delegation clauses in a new way. Recall that sec-
tion 2 of the FAA states that “[a] written provision . . . to settle by 
arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble.”145 The Court held that a delegation clause is its own “written [ar-
bitration] provision” within the meaning of the statute: 
The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues 
concerning the arbitration agreement. . . . An agreement to arbitrate 
 
 136. Id. at 481. 
 137. Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2002). 
 138. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).  
 139. Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims at 2–3, Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., No. 
3:07-cv-00050-LRH-RAM, 2007 WL 7140327 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2007).  
 140. Jackson v. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 141. Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Attorney Fees, Jackson v. Rent-A-
Center, W., Inc., No. CV07–00050 LRH (RAM), 2007 WL 7031087 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2007).  
 142. Rent-A-Center, 581 F.3d 912 at 917.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–70 (2010). 
 145. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
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a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the 
party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the 
FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does 
on any other.146 
By deeming delegation clauses to be industrial-strength arbitra-
tion clauses, Rent-A-Center extended the parity assumption from arbi-
tration about the merits of a lawsuit to arbitration about arbitration.147 
Under Rent-A-Center, no rule can be “based on the notion that arbi-
tration is inferior to litigation in court”148—even if it merely allocates 
jurisdiction between judges and arbitrators to decide whether arbitra-
tion is warranted. For example, as noted, before Rent-A-Center, several 
courts did not allow arbitrators to decide unconscionability challenges 
because of their “self-interest in deciding that a dispute is arbitrable.”149 
After Rent-A-Center, these same courts have reluctantly acknowledged 
that their previous rulings “discriminate[] against arbitration, putting 
agreements to arbitrate on a lesser footing than agreements to select 
any judicial forum for dispute resolution.”150 Thus, they have “re-
ject[ed] the argument, however practical it may be, that an arbitrator 
will be unable to determine the question of arbitrability because he or 
she may potentially be driven by an ulterior interest in keeping the case 
in arbitration to generate fees.”151 
In sum, although the test for distinguishing matters of substantive 
and procedural arbitrability has long been obscure, the Court has grad-
ually given arbitrators more power. At the same time, arbitration 
clauses have become common in consumer and employment contracts, 
partially privatizing the civil justice system. Accordingly, as I discuss 
next, the tug of war between courts and arbitrators has now spread into 
one of the most divisive areas in American civil justice—the relation-
ship between the FAA and class actions. 
 
 146. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68–70 (citations omitted). 
 147. See Horton, supra note 13, at 373–76 (criticizing this maneuver).  
 148. THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2014).  
 149. Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 481 (Ct. App. 2008), abro-
gated by Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621 (Ct. App. 2014) and Malone v. Superior 
Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241 (Ct. App. 2014); see also supra text accompanying notes 138–39. 
 150. Malone, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 255. 
 151. Phillips v. Bestway Rental, Inc., No. 4:12CV48, 2013 WL 832306, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 
Mar. 6, 2013), aff’d, 542 F. App’x 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); accord Tiri, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 635 (reasoning that fairness concerns over outcome-interested arbitrators would ultimately 
lead to the conclusion “that delegation clauses in employment arbitration agreements are cate-
gorically unenforceable”).  
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B. Arbitration About Class Actions 
Recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,152 American Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,153 and Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis,154 the Court made class-arbitration waivers enforceable in al-
most all circumstances. These opinions have inspired an ongoing policy 
debate.155 From a doctrinal perspective, though, their holdings are 
“both broad and clear”: no court can “impose class arbitration despite 
a contractual agreement for individualized arbitration.”156 Yet, Con-
cepcion, Italian Colors, and Epic Systems only govern express class-ar-
bitration waivers. In a closely related area—where an arbitration 
clause does not mention class actions—the law is a tangled mess. As 
this Section explains, jurisdictions disagree over whether judges or ar-
bitrators should decide if a silent arbitration provision permits class ac-
tions. 
In the 1990s, most courts held that unless a contract affirmatively 
authorized class arbitration—which, of course, none did—plaintiffs 
needed to arbitrate on an individual basis.157 As the Seventh Circuit 
explained, the FAA mandates that judges enforce arbitration clauses 
“in accordance with the[ir] terms.”158 Thus, it “forbids . . . class arbitra-
tion where the parties’ arbitration agreement is silent on the matter.”159 
But matters became far more complex in 2003, when the Court 
decided Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.160 Green Tree’s loan 
agreement mandated that “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies aris-
ing from or relating to this contract . . . shall be resolved by binding 
arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you.”161 
 
 152. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).  
 153. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). 
 154. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018). 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18.  
 156. Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 157. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995); Herrington v. Union 
Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1034 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Mar-
wick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. 
Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993); Med. Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 
1998) (“[T]o require class-wide arbitration would alter the agreements of the parties, whose arbi-
tration agreements do not provide for class-wide arbitration.”). But see Blue Cross v. Superior 
Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 790 (Ct. App. 1998) (allowing classwide arbitration); Dickler v. Shear-
son Lehman Hutton, Inc. 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same).  
 158. Champ, 55 F.3d at 274 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)).  
 159. Id. at 275.  
 160. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 161. Id. at 448 (emphasis and citation omitted). 
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Two groups of plaintiffs filed class actions against Green Tree for vio-
lating a state consumer protection statute.162 An arbitrator awarded 
one class $10,935,000 and the other $9,200,000.163 Green Tree appealed, 
but the South Carolina Supreme Court held that class arbitration was 
permissible because the contracts did not expressly prohibit such pro-
cedures.164 The Court granted certiorari to consider whether the FAA 
“prohibits class-action procedures from being superimposed onto an 
arbitration agreement that does not provide for class-action arbitra-
tion.”165 
The result was a highly fractured plurality opinion that did not 
break along classic ideological lines. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices 
Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that the arbitrator—not the state 
trial court—should decide whether class arbitration is authorized.166 
Justice Breyer rested this conclusion entirely on the expertise theory 
of arbitrability, reasoning that arbitrators are well situated to interpret 
the arbitration clause: 
The question here . . . . concerns neither the validity of the arbitration 
clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the par-
ties. . . . Rather the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration 
proceeding the parties agreed to. That question does not concern a 
state statute or judicial procedures. It concerns contract interpreta-
tion and arbitration procedures. Arbitrators are well situated to an-
swer that question.167 
Because the arbitrator had never formally interpreted the arbitra-
tion clause, Justice Breyer remanded the cases to allow the parties to 
“obtain[] the arbitration decision that their contracts foresee.”168 
Justice Stevens joined the judgment but wrote separately.169 As he 
saw it, “[t]here is nothing in the [FAA] that precludes” a finding that a 
silent arbitration clause allows class actions.170 He conceded that 
“[a]rguably the interpretation of the parties’ agreement should have 
been made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather than the 
 
 162. Id. at 448–49.  
 163. Id. at 449.  
 164. Id. at 450.  
 165. Brief of Petitioner at *i, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, No. 02-634, 2003 WL 721716 
(Feb. 24, 2003).  
 166. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.  
 167. Id. at 452–53 (emphasis and citation omitted).  
 168. Id. at 453. 
 169. Id. at 454–55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).  
 170. Id.  
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court.”171 Nevertheless, “[b]ecause the decision to conduct a class-ac-
tion arbitration was correct as a matter of law,” he would have pre-
ferred to affirm the award rather than remand to the arbitrator.172 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor 
and Kennedy, noted that the plurality had moved the goalposts.173 
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that First Options had established 
that the distinction between substantive and procedural arbitrability 
hinges on the significance of the disputed issue to the parties, not on 
the comparative competence of courts or arbitrators.174 Because he be-
lieved that few issues are more consequential than whether a case can 
proceed as a class action, Chief Justice Rehnquist would have classified 
clause construction as a matter of substantive arbitrability for judges.175 
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist accused the South Carolina Su-
preme Court of misunderstanding the contract.176 Noting that the 
agreements mentioned the use of “one arbitrator selected by us with 
the consent of you,”177 Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that class-wide 
arbitration denied Green Tree its “contractual right to choose an arbi-
trator for each dispute with the other 3,734 individual class mem-
bers.”178 
Bazzle seemed to signal the dawn of the class-arbitration era. The 
plurality and Justice Stevens only disagreed about whether to remand 
the case, not about the overarching law.179 As a result, there were five 
votes for two related propositions: (1) class arbitration is a viable 
method of dispute resolution, and (2) if an arbitration clause says noth-
ing about class actions, its interpretation is a matter of procedural ar-
bitrability for arbitrators.180 Thus, shortly after the case came down, the 
 
 171. Id. at 455. 
 172. Id.  
 173. See id. at 455–57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 174. See id. at 456–57.  
 175. See id.  
 176. See id. at 455. 
 177. Id. at 458 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 178. Id. at 459. Justice Thomas also dissented to reassert his longstanding view that the FAA 
does not apply in state courts. See id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 166–71.  
 180. See Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent 
Course at the Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1677, 1702 (2005) (“[W]hether an arbitration agreement prohibits (or is silent on) class 
arbitration by its terms is a procedural gateway issue to be decided by the arbitrator.”). 
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AAA announced that it would administer class arbitrations.181 Track-
ing Bazzle, the institution mandated that an arbitrator decide in a 
“clause construction award” whether a silent arbitration clause permit-
ted class claims.182 Because class actions bind absent parties who are 
entitled to notice of proceedings that impact their rights, the AAA es-
tablished rigid rules for clause-construction awards.183 Rather than per-
mitting them to be unwritten and confidential, the AAA directed arbi-
trators to explain their reasoning and publish their holdings on its 
website.184 According to data released by the company, its arbitrators 
issued 135 clause-construction awards between 2004 and 2009, 95 of 
which (70 percent) held that the contract involved did permit class ar-
bitration.185 
But in 2010, the winds shifted with Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal-
Feeds International Corp.186 Stolt-Nielsen, a shipping company, entered 
into a maritime contract with AnimalFeeds, one of its customers.187 The 
agreement required “[a]ny dispute arising from [its] making, perfor-
mance or termination” to be arbitrated.188 After the Department of 
Justice discovered that Stolt-Nielsen had been illegally fixing prices, 
AnimalFeeds filed an antitrust class action against the firm.189 The par-
ties agreed to submit clause construction to a three-arbitrator panel.190 
In its brief, AnimalFeeds contended that class arbitration was permis-
sible for two main reasons: “(a) the clause is silent on the issue of class 
treatment and, without express prohibition, class arbitration is permit-
ted under Bazzle [and] (b) the clause should be construed to permit 
 
 181. See generally AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS su-
pra, note 40. JAMS followed suit. See generally JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/. [https://perma.cc/NZQ8-FZVE].  
 182. AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, supra note 40, 
r. 3, at 3. 
 183. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral 
Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1768–78 (2006).  
 184. AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, supra note 40, 
r. 3, at 3; id. r. 9, at 7 (“The presumption of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings 
shall not apply in class arbitrations.”). 
 185. See Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 22, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 
WL 2896309. Another 33 (24 percent) involved stipulations that class arbitration was allowed. Id. 
 186. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 187. Id. at 666. 
 188. Id. at 667. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 668. 
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class arbitration as a matter of public policy.”191 At the hearing, Ani-
malFeeds’ counsel elaborated on the first point, stating that “the par-
ties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no 
agreement that has been reached on that issue, [and] therefore there 
has been no agreement to bar class arbitrations.”192 
The panel held that the agreement permitted class claims.193 The 
panel began by noting that most arbitrators in previous cases had in-
terpreted silent arbitration provisions to authorize class actions.194 In 
addition, the panel observed that the awards “rel[ied] on the same type 
of broad wording” as could be found in the contract’s arbitration 
clause.195 The award did not mention public policy, although during 
oral argument, one arbitrator expressed concern about whether nu-
merous individual arbitrations are an adequate substitute for the class 
device.196 
The case then wound its way up to the Court, which took the ex-
traordinary step of reversing the panel’s decision.197 Justice Alito’s ma-
jority opinion began by acknowledging that courts rarely overrule ar-
bitrators.198 Nevertheless, the Court held that the panel had exceeded 
its powers under section 10 of the FAA by “impos[ing] its own view of 
sound policy regarding class arbitration.”199 Recall that AnimalFeeds’ 
lawyer had contended before the arbitral tribunal that there was “no 
agreement” about the permissibility of class actions, and thus that the 
contract did not ban them.200 Seizing on the first part of this argument 
and ignoring the second, the Court reasoned that AnimalFeeds had 
 
 191. Id. at 672. (emphasis and citation omitted). AnimalFeeds also claimed that “the clause 
would be unconscionable and unenforceable if it forbade class arbitration.” Id. The arbitrators 
did not address this issue. Id. 
 192. Joint Appendix at 77a, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) 
(No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2777896. 
 193. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded, 559 U.S. 662 (2010).  
 194. See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 669. 
 195. See Reply Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 12, Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3474-cv), 2006 WL 6837690.  
 196. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 675 n.7. 
 197. Id. at 672. 
 198. See id. at 671.  
 199. Id. at 672. 
 200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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conceded that “there was ‘no agreement’” either to permit or to pre-
clude class arbitration.201 In turn, because there was no shared under-
standing on the topic, the panel could not have grounded its ruling in 
the language of the contract.202 Instead, it must have “rested its decision 
on AnimalFeeds’ public policy argument.”203 According to the Court, 
this violated the axiom that “the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and 
enforce a contract, not to make public policy.”204 
The Court then explained why the award could not be defended 
on the ground that the arbitrators had applied a default rule that au-
thorizes class arbitration.205 Namely, there is a great chasm between 
class arbitration and traditional two-party arbitration: 
Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the 
shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration. An arbitra-
tor chosen according to an agreed-upon procedure . . . no longer re-
solves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement, but 
instead resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even 
thousands of parties. . . . The arbitrator’s award no longer purports to 
bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates 
the rights of absent parties as well.206 
Therefore, the Court announced that “[a]n implicit agreement to 
authorize class-action arbitration . . . is not a term that the arbitrator 
may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”207 
Stolt-Nielsen caused enormous confusion about judicial review of 
arbitral clause-construction awards. The opinion lent itself to two dia-
metrically opposed readings. On the one hand, it is filled with rhetoric 
 
 201. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687. 
 202. Id. at 676. 
 203. Id. at 672–73.  
 204. Id. at 672. 
 205. Id. at 687. 
 206. Id. at 686. 
 207. Id. at 685. Stolt-Nielsen also undercut the conventional view that Bazzle held that clause 
construction was a matter of procedural arbitrability. See id. at 679–80. The Court focused on the 
fifth vote in Bazzle for that perspective: Justice Stevens’s concurrence and dissent. See id. at 679. 
As Justice Alito observed in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Stevens “did not take a definitive position on 
the [clause-construction] question [in Bazzle], stating only that ‘[a]rguably the interpretation of 
the parties’ agreement should have been made in the first instance by the arbitrator.’” Id. (quoting 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 455 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment 
and dissenting in part)); see also supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. However, Stolt-Niel-
sen did not involve the question whether courts or arbitrators should presumptively engage in 
clause construction because the parties had expressly assigned the task to the arbitrators. 559 U.S. 
at 680; supra text accompanying note 188. 
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about the incompatibility of class actions and arbitration.208 This sug-
gests that class arbitration is so aberrant that the only way to authorize 
it is to include a provision that says something like “class procedures 
are permissible.”209 Reinforcing this view, the Court appeared to dis-
pose of the case by applying a clear statement rule. It held that the con-
tract’s expansive arbitration clause—which covered “[a]ny dispute 
arising from [its] making, performance or termination”210—was not a 
sufficient textual hook to justify the arbitral award.211 As a result, some 
courts have asserted that Stolt-Nielsen invalidates any arbitral award 
that interpreted a silent contract to permit class claims.212 
But seen through another prism, Stolt-Nielsen does not extend be-
yond its unusual facts. Arguably, the case hinged on AnimalFeeds’ ad-
mission that the contract was silent in the sense that “there was ‘no 
agreement’” with respect to class arbitration.213 Indeed, the Court ex-
plained that this concession made it impossible for the arbitrators to 
conclude that the parties had consented to class procedures. As Justice 
Alito put it, the panel’s efforts to discern the parties’ intent from the 
language of the clause were irrelevant because there was “no room for 
 
 208. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–87 (reasoning that class arbitration is slower and more 
formal than two-party arbitration). 
 210. Id. at 667. 
 211. See id. at 685 (reasoning that an “agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . . is 
not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbi-
trate”). 
 212. See, e.g., Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 642-–43 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated 
by Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) (holding that an arbitrator exceeded 
his powers by interpreting an arbitration provision that governed “any dispute” and allowed “any 
remedy” to authorize class claims); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 
405 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 
483 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the mere existence of an arbitration clause “operates as an implied 
waiver of the plaintiff’s class claims”); Goodale v. George S. May Int’l Co., No. 10 C 5733, 2011 
WL 1337349, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011) (holding that Stolt-Nielsen “squarely foreclose[d] the 
possibility that the class claims are arbitrable”); cf. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. 
Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (permitting 
class claims to proceed in court because “[i]n accordance with Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitration may 
not be imposed on parties whose arbitration agreements are silent on the permissibility of class 
proceedings”); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 41, at 1155 (“A general arbitration clause, ac-
cording to the Stolt-Nielsen Court, does not authorize class arbitration because class arbitration 
differs too much from individual arbitration.”); Terry F. Moritz & Brandon J. Fitch, The Future 
of Consumer Arbitration in Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) 
(“Stolt-Nielsen seems to signal the end of inferred class arbitration . . . .”). 
 213. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687. 
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an inquiry . . . into that settled question.”214 Yet, what if a litigant did 
not repeat AnimalFeeds’ mistake? Plaintiffs began to probe this soft 
spot by arguing that their arbitration clauses were silent in a different 
way. Rather than stipulating that the parties’ minds had not met, they 
argued that their contracts had merely failed to memorialize a shared 
understanding that class arbitration was permissible.215 This theory 
gained traction; the First, Second, and Third Circuits affirmed arbitral 
awards allowing class claims even where the agreement did not “in-
cant[] ‘class arbitration’ or otherwise expressly provide[] for aggregate 
procedures.”216 
In 2013, the Court tried to dispel some of this haze with Oxford 
Health Plans LLC v. Sutter.217 John Sutter, a doctor, filed a class action 
against Oxford Health Plans LLC, alleging that it had failed to timely 
reimburse doctors for their expenses.218 The contract between the par-
ties provided, in part: “No civil action concerning any dispute arising 
under this [a]greement shall be instituted before any court, and all such 
disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration . . . .”219 Sut-
ter and Oxford agreed to submit the clause-construction question to an 
arbitrator, who held that the contract authorized class arbitration.220 In 
 
 214. Id. at 676. Likewise, in a footnote, Justice Alito seemed to limit Stolt-Nielsen by remark-
ing that “[w]e have no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding that the 
parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration” because “the parties stipulated that there was 
‘no agreement on [this] issue.’” Id. at 687 n.10. 
 215. See, e.g., Amerix Corp. v. Jones, Nos. JFM-11-2844, JFM-05-3028, JFM-11-2192, JFM-
09-1498, 2012 WL 141150, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2012) (noting that the party seeking class treat-
ment argued that “silence” did not “constitute lack of intent to agree, but” rather a clandestine 
“agreement to submit to class arbitration”). 
 216. Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 569 U.S. 564 
(2013); accord Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass’n Ltd., 683 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“We thus reject the . . . precept . . . that there must be express contractual language evincing the 
parties’ intent to permit class or collective arbitration.”); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 
113, 124 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Stolt-Nielsen . . . did not create a bright-line rule requiring that arbitra-
tion agreements can only be construed to permit class arbitration where they contain express pro-
visions permitting class arbitration.”); see also Rame, LLC v. Popovich, 878 F. Supp. 2d 439, 448 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Stolt-Nielsen only controls if the parties “stipulate that there was 
no explicit or implicit intent to submit to class arbitration”); La. Health Serv. Indem. Co. v. Gam-
bro A B, 756 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762, 768 (W.D. La. 2010) (affirming an arbitral clause-construction 
award allowing class arbitration despite the fact that the “arbitration agreement was silent on 
class arbitration just as the arbitration clause considered by the Court in Stolt-Nielsen”); Truly 
Nolen of Am. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“[C]lass action 
arbitration is not prohibited if both parties have agreed to the procedure explicitly or implicitly.”). 
 217. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013). 
 218. See id. at 566. 
 219. Id. (citation omitted). 
 220. Id.  
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particular, the arbitrator noted that the clause mandated arbitration of 
“any dispute.”221 In turn, the arbitrator reasoned that “the disputes that 
the clause sends to arbitration are the same universal class of disputes 
the clause prohibits as civil actions,” which must include class claims.222 
Oxford moved to vacate the award, arguing that it flouted Stolt-Nielsen 
by holding that the parties had “authorize[d] the use of class proce-
dures simply by agreeing to arbitrate their disputes.”223 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan upheld the arbitrator’s rul-
ing.224 Like Justice Alito in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Kagan began by em-
phasizing just how much deference judges must give to arbitrators, ob-
serving that “the sole question for us is whether the arbitrator (even 
arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he got its 
meaning right or wrong.”225 Justice Kagan then explained that the ar-
bitrator’s ruling cleared this low hurdle because it “focused on the ar-
bitration clause’s text, analyzing (whether correctly or not makes no 
difference) the scope of both what it barred from court and what it sent 
to arbitration.”226 In addition, the Court distinguished Stolt-Nielsen on 
the grounds that the parties there had failed to agree one way or the 
other about whether class arbitration was permissible: 
We overturned the arbitral decision there because it lacked any con-
tractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it 
lacked . . . a “sufficient” one. The parties in Stolt-Nielsen had entered 
into an unusual stipulation that they had never reached an agreement 
on class arbitration. In that circumstance, we noted, the panel’s deci-
sion was not—indeed, could not have been—“based on a determina-
tion regarding the parties’ intent.” . . . Here, the arbitrator did con-
strue the contract (focusing, per usual, on its language), and did find 
an agreement to permit class arbitration.227 
Thus, the Court held, an arbitral decision that “arguably con-
stru[es]” the contract survives, “however good, bad, or ugly.”228 
 
 221. Joint Appendix at 31, Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) (No. 12-
135), 2013 WL 275685. 
 222. Id. at 17. 
 223. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) (No. 
12-135), 2013 WL 244026.  
 224. See Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 568–73. 
 225. Id. at 569. 
 226. Id. at 570. 
 227. Id. at 571 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 673 n.4 
(2010)) (citations omitted). 
 228. Id. at 572–73 (quoting E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 
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Although Oxford Health resolved one split in authority, it quietly 
caused another. By endorsing the narrow reading of Stolt-Nielsen, it 
stemmed the tide of courts aggressively second-guessing arbitral 
clause-construction awards. Now, as long as the plaintiff does not con-
cede that silence means “no agreement,” an arbitrator’s ruling will sur-
vive judicial review if it is rooted in the contract’s text. But Oxford 
Health also implies that clause construction might no longer be a mat-
ter of procedural arbitrability.229 Recall that there were five votes in 
Bazzle for the proposition that arbitrators—not courts—should decide 
whether a silent arbitration clause allows class actions.230 Nevertheless, 
in a footnote, Justice Kagan observed that the Court would likely re-
visit the issue.231 
Since then, jurisdictions have splintered over whether clause con-
struction is a matter of procedural or substantive arbitrability. Judges 
in the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that Bazzle remains good 
law; accordingly, they continue to allocate clause construction to the 
arbitrator.232 For instance, in Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc.,233 the 
 
17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)). 
 229. Id. at 569–70 n.2.  
 230. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.  
 231. See Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 569–70 n.2. To be fair, it was Stolt-Nielsen that un-
dermined Bazzle. See supra text accompanying notes 197–207. Justice Kagan simply pointed out 
that Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority “made clear that this Court has not yet decided 
whether the availability of class arbitration is a question of [substantive] arbitrability.” Oxford 
Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 569–70 n.2. As in Stolt-Nielsen, Oxford Health did not tee up the issue 
because the parties had expressly agreed to allocate clause construction to the arbitrators. See id.  
 232. See Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C. v. Tucker, 195 F. Supp. 3d 543, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(“In the absence of Supreme Court precedent expressly disavowing Bazzle[,] . . . the Court finds 
that the availability of class arbitration under the arbitration provisions at issue should be decided 
by the arbitrator . . . .”); see also In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., No. 12 CV 2656(AJN), 2014 WL 
2445756, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014) (reasoning that “the availability of class arbitration does 
not concern . . . either the general enforceability of an arbitration agreement or . . . which sub-
stantive claims may be subject to an arbitration clause”); Lee v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 982 F. 
Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining that Bazzle provides “useful guidance”). But see 
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 950 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (stating that when 
parties do not clearly agree to arbitrate the question of arbitrability, the issue is subject to judicial 
review). Likewise, arbitrators sometimes resolve the “who decides” question. Not surprisingly, 
they invariably seem to rule that they have jurisdiction to determine whether class arbitration is 
permissible. See, e.g., Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 6–9, Savaria v. Steiner Leisure 
Ltd., Case No. 12-460-454-12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Emp’t & Class Action Arbitration Tribunal 2013) 
(Dinneen, Arb.) [hereinafter Savaria Award]; Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 3–4, 
McCullough v. Terminal Trucking Co., Case No. 31 160 00371 12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Emp’t & Class 
Action Arb. Tribunal 2013) (Dinneen, Arb.) [hereinafter McCullough Award]. 
 233. Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506 (Cal. 2016).  
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California Supreme Court invoked Wiley’s efficiency theory of arbitra-
bility; it reasoned that a “presumption that arbitrators decide the avail-
ability of class arbitration is more consistent with the desire for ‘expe-
ditious results’ that motivates many an arbitration agreement.”234 In 
addition, the court rejected the argument that arbitrators’ “incentives 
in the form of potential higher fees . . . cause them to favor contract 
interpretations allowing for class arbitration.”235 As the California jus-
tices explained, the parity assumption “requires that we treat arbitra-
tion as a coequal forum for dispute resolution.”236 
Conversely, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits 
have predicted that the Court is just “a short step away from the con-
clusion that whether an arbitration agreement authorizes class arbitra-
tion . . . requires judicial review.”237 Invoking the intent theory, these 
courts reason that judges, not arbitrators, should decide the bet-the-
company issue of whether a silent arbitration clause allows class proce-
dures: 
Unlike the question whether, say, one party to an arbitration agree-
ment has waived his claim against the other—which of course is a sub-
sidiary question—the question whether the parties agreed to class-
wide arbitration is vastly more consequential than even the gateway 
question whether they agreed to arbitrate bilaterally. An incorrect 
answer in favor of classwide arbitration would “forc[e] parties to ar-
bitrate” not merely a single “matter that they may well not have 
agreed to arbitrate”[,] but thousands of them.238 
 
 234. Id. at 518 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 633 
(1985)). 
 235. Id. at 522. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 907 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The availa-
bility of class or collective arbitration involves a foundational question of arbitrability: whether 
the potential parties to the arbitration agreed to arbitrate.”); Dell Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 
817 F.3d 867, 875 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (reasoning that “recently[,] the Court has given every indication, short of an outright 
holding, that classwide arbitrability is a gateway question [of substantive arbitrability] rather than 
a subsidiary one” of procedural arbitrability). 
 238. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598–99 (alterations in original) (quoting Howsam v. Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)); accord Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 
F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The answer to this question will change the very nature of the 
underlying controversy.”); Dell Webb Cmtys., 817 F.3d at 875–76 (“[I]n bilateral arbitration, the 
lack of rigorous procedural rules greatly increases the speed and lowers the cost of the dispute 
resolution, but in class arbitration, procedural formality is required, reducing—or eliminating al-
together—these advantages.”); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Traditional individual arbitration and class arbitration are so distinct that a choice between the 
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Yet, here, the Court’s recent expansion of arbitral power muddies 
the waters. Recall that after Rent-A-Center, parties can “clearly and 
unmistakably” assign matters of substantive arbitrability to arbitra-
tors.239 As a result, even in jurisdictions where judges presumptively 
resolve clause construction, the widespread use of delegation clauses 
passes the torch back to arbitrators. For example, in Robinson v. J & 
K Administrative Management Services, Inc.,240 a business required its 
workers to arbitrate disagreements relating to “the applicability of the 
[arbitration clause] . . . to a particular dispute or claim.”241 The Fifth 
Circuit cited this “sweeping language concerning the scope of the ques-
tions committed to arbitration” to hold that the arbitrator should per-
form clause construction.242 Likewise, a handful of district courts have 
held that “even if the issue of classwide arbitration is classified as a 
gateway issue [for courts], the parties clearly and unmistakably dele-
gated the question of class arbitration to an arbitrator.”243 Thus, until 
drafters exempt clause construction from their delegation clauses, ar-
bitrators will continue to interpret silent arbitration provisions. 
*   *   * 
Jurisdictions disagree about whether courts or arbitrators should 
decide whether an arbitration clause that does not mention class ac-
tions nevertheless permits them. The next Part uses this doctrinal chaos 
to examine how judges and arbitrators perform clause construction. 
 
two goes, we believe, to the very type of controversy to be resolved.”). Likewise, in an un-
published opinion, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court order striking class claims from 
a complaint that would be sent to arbitration, thereby implying that the judge had jurisdiction to 
decide whether the contract permitted class arbitration. See Eshagh v. Terminix Int’l Co., 588 F. 
App’x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2014).  
 239. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.  
 240. Robinson v. J&K Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 817 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 241. Id. at 194.  
 242. Id. at 196. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003)).  
 243. Rossi v. SCI Funeral Servs. of N.Y., Inc., No. 15 CV 473 (ERK) (VMS), 2016 WL 524253, 
at *13 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016); accord Hedrick v. BNC Nat’l Bank, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1195–
96 (D. Kan. 2016) (“However, even assuming that the availability of class arbitration is a question 
of [substantive] arbitrability, the Court finds that the arbitrator must determine this question be-
cause the Employment Agreement provides clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties in-
tended the arbitrator to determine questions of arbitrability.” (quotations omitted)). But see Dish 
Network, L.L.C. v. Ray, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1172 (D. Colo. 2016) (“As to the parties’ broad 
agreement regarding matters to be submitted to arbitration, there is nothing in the language used 
expressly delegating authority to the arbitrator to decide issues of [substantive] arbitrability.”). 
HORTON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019 2:15 PM 
1358  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1323 
II.  EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION 
This Part uses an original dataset to examine how courts and arbi-
trators resolve clause construction. It begins by explaining how I con-
ducted my research and by describing the benefits and limitations of 
my approach. It then demonstrates that the identity of the deci-
sionmaker has a profound impact on clause-construction results. 
A. Methodology and Caveats 
The modern clause-construction era began in June 2010, immedi-
ately after the Court decided Stolt-Nielsen. Previously, under Bazzle, 
arbitrators enjoyed a monopoly on determining whether a silent arbi-
tration provision permitted class actions.244 But Stolt-Nielsen prompted 
many courts to rebrand clause construction as a matter of substantive 
arbitrability, sparking the current jurisdictional split.245 Since then, 
both judges and arbitrators have regularly weighed in on the topic. 
To compare the handiwork of these two species of decisionmak-
ers, I searched the AAA website, Westlaw, Lexis, and PACER for 
clause-construction opinions and awards decided between June 1, 
2010, and February 15, 2019. To focus in narrowly on interpretations 
of silent arbitration clauses, I cut out any ruling that dealt with a satel-
lite issue, such as whether a plaintiff had met her burden of demon-
strating that a class action was feasible or whether a court should con-
firm a previous arbitral award.246 This left me with 150 documents: 44 
judicial opinions and 106 arbitral awards. 
Using clause construction to assess judges and arbitrators has sev-
eral advantages. First, most empirical research on arbitration operates 
at a high level of generality. Scholars usually rely on information re-
ported by the AAA under Section 1281.96 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure.247 This statute requires arbitration providers to dis-
close overarching facts about all the cases they administer—not just 
 
 244. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.  
 245. See supra notes 231–42 and accompanying text. 
 246. I also dropped cases that applied state arbitration law (rather than the FAA), as well as 
those that dealt with express waivers of class action rights.  
 247. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 39, at 3; Horton & Chandrasekher, After the Revolution, su-
pra note 39, at 88. Admittedly, there are exceptions. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
ARBITRATION STUDY §§ 5.4, 5.6 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitra-
tion-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY97-MWX2] (surveying 341 awarded 
cases in financial-services arbitrations by pulling them directly from AAA case files); SEARLE 
CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION: BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION xii (2009), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Searle%20
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those in California—such as the filing and ruling dates and the identi-
ties of the company, the arbitrator, and the plaintiffs’ lawyers.248 Alt-
hough these facts can be helpful, they reveal nothing about the arbitral 
decision-making process.249 Conversely, the AAA’s policy of publiciz-
ing all filings in potential class arbitrations paints a vivid picture of what 
happens in private dispute resolution. Because I can base my analysis 
on the actual clause-construction awards in these disputes, I can deter-
mine which side prevailed and why. 
Second, focusing on clause construction minimizes selection bi-
ases. Even if one were able to obtain results from both arbitration and 
litigation, juxtaposing them would not necessarily shed light on the 
Court’s parity assumption because complaints that are arbitrated di-
verge from those that are litigated.250 Suppose a researcher determined 
that employees win more often in court than in private tribunals. This 
would not necessarily prove that arbitration is less hospitable to plain-
tiffs. Instead, it could reflect systemic differences in the case streams 
that feed the two spheres. For instance, arbitration might feature 
weaker claims because low-level employees, who have few rights, are 
more likely to be subject to arbitration clauses than executives, who 
often enjoy contractual protections against being fired.251 
However, examining clause construction limits these distortions. 
This unique context—where both judges and arbitrators decide mat-
ters about arbitration—features a single case stream: those that arise 
from contracts that contain arbitration clauses. Moreover, whether 
these matters end up on the desk of a judge or an arbitrator has nothing 
 
Civil%20Justice%20Institute%20Report%20on%20Consumer%20Arbitration.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3VU9-9QVW] (surveying 301 awards using a similar technique). 
 248. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.96(a)(1)–(11) (2018) (listing the information that ar-
bitration institutions must provide).  
 249. In addition, the lack of information makes it hard to determine which side “won” an 
award. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 39, at 5 (considering a plaintiff recovery of one dollar or more 
as a “win”); Horton & Chandrasekher, After the Revolution, supra note 39, at 99 (same). This is 
both overinclusive (because it deems a trivial recovery a victory) and underinclusive (because it 
treats awards of equitable relief as a loss). Fortunately, clause-construction rulings suffer from no 
such ambiguity.  
 250. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1290–91 (enumerating reasons why “it seems very 
likely that there are systematic differences between arbitrated and litigated cases”). 
 251. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that “higher overall employee win rates” may 
reflect “the greater likelihood of success under individually negotiated contracts”). Likewise, the 
quality of advocacy in arbitration might not equal its counterpart in litigation. After all, “arbi-
trated disputes tend to involve lower financial stakes,” which means that plaintiffs “will invest less 
in legal research.” Weidemaier, supra note 37, at 1135–36.  
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to do with the power dynamics between the parties. Instead, the deter-
minant is a particular jurisdiction’s view on whether reading a silent 
arbitration provision is a question of substantive or procedural arbitra-
bility.252 Because this doctrinal split is so pronounced, these cases have 
almost been randomly assigned to each species of decisionmaker. 
Statistical analyses of arbitration results also suffer from another 
selection bias. Variations in win rates between arbitration and litiga-
tion may not be instructive because fully litigated and fully arbitrated 
matters are not representative of all matters. As George L. Priest and 
Benjamin Klein famously argue, case outcomes do not show that the 
law favors one side or the other.253 Priest and Klein note that adver-
saries should be able to value, and therefore settle, most disputes.254 
Accordingly, only close, boundary-straddling matters, where the par-
ties disagree on the range of potential outcomes, should progress all 
the way to a final judgment.255 In turn, this means that no matter how 
the applicable rules are calibrated, plaintiffs and defendants should 
each prevail about half of the time.256 Moreover, any deviation from 
these coin-flip win rates does not necessarily demonstrate that the law 
is slanted. Rather, it merely reveals that one cohort has more at stake 
or is better informed than the other about the likelihood of success.257 
Clause-construction awards are less likely to suffer from this flaw. 
Parties have little motivation to settle before the clause-construction 
stage. Until someone interprets the arbitration clause, nobody knows 
whether a case is a mammoth class action or an individualized small-
dollar lawsuit. Thus, most cases with silent arbitration clauses are prob-
ably going to end up in clause construction.258 
Third, clause construction is the perfect vehicle for isolating the 
impact of decisionmakers—rather than some other variable—on out-
comes. Even putting aside the selection biases mentioned above, there 
are any number of reasons why parties might perform better in one 
 
 252. In addition, as noted above, even in jurisdictions that treat clause construction as a matter 
of substantive arbitrability, drafters can assign the issue to arbitrators through delegation clauses. 
See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text. 
 253. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5 (1984) (studying the results of litigated and settled disputes). 
 254. See id. at 12–15.  
 255. See id. at 15.  
 256. See id. at 15–17.  
 257. See id. at 24–25.  
 258. See King, supra note 41, at 1070 (“The lack of docket activity after clause construction 
awards are issued suggests that they are often de facto dispositive.”).  
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forum. Perhaps it is more difficult to substantiate a cause of action 
without full-fledged judicial discovery. Alternatively, it might be easier 
to introduce powerful testimony or a “smoking gun” document in ar-
bitration because traditional evidentiary rules do not always apply. 
Yet, as further discussed below, parties argue about clause construction 
under identical conditions in both court and arbitration.259 In fact, in-
terpreting a silent arbitration clause is an inkblot of an issue that gives 
the adjudicator extraordinary discretion.260 Thus, it allows the deci-
sionmaker’s underlying predispositions to shine through. 
Admittedly, my research is also subject to a few caveats. For one, 
clause-construction orders may not be representative of other types of 
awards. Arbitral rulings normally never see the light of day. But when 
an arbitrator reads a silent arbitration clause, she knows that the AAA 
will publish her work product. This additional scrutiny might push her 
to grapple with the issues in greater detail. Similarly, there may be no 
link between how a judge or an arbitrator reads an arbitration provi-
sion and how she resolves, say, allegations under a consumer protec-
tion statute or Title VII. Thus, as made apparent in Part III, I do not 
contend that patterns in clause-construction rulings cast light on the 
parity assumption in general; rather, I confine my analysis to the dis-
crete topic of how courts and arbitrators resolve disputes about arbi-
tration. 
Finally, my data only includes one state trial court decision.261 As 
far as I know, there is no reliable way to search opinions at this level. 
Nevertheless, this blind spot may not actually be very large. Under the 
Class Action Fairness Act, federal district courts have jurisdiction over 
most major class actions.262 Accordingly, there are probably not many 
state trial clause-construction orders in the first place. 
 
 259. See infra Part II.B.  
 260. See infra Part II.B. 
 261. The exception is a California Superior Court case that is available on Westlaw. See Peti-
tion for an Order to Compel Arbitration at *9, Gray v. Select Temps. Inc., No. BC514799, 2015 
WL 10734850 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 1, 2015).  
 262. See Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)–(5)(B) (2012) (giving federal 
courts jurisdiction over class actions as long as at least one plaintiff and defendant are from dif-
ferent states, the class consists of at least 100 members, and the alleged damages exceed $5 mil-
lion).  
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B. Results 
There is a vast difference in how courts and arbitrators decide 
clause construction. Just 4.5 percent of judges interpreted a silent arbi-
tration clause as permitting class claims.263 Conversely, 54.7 percent of 
arbitrators reached the opposite conclusion, a difference that is statis-
tically significant (p = 0.000). This discord occurred even though both 
the judge and arbitrator subsamples include cases from many of the 
same jurisdictions. 
 
  
 
 263. Three recent judicial opinions—McElrath v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-07241-JSC, 
2017 WL 1175591 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2017), Gonzalez v. Ceva Logistics U.S., Inc., No. 16-cv-
04282-WHO, 2016 WL 6427866 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016), and Mims v. Adecco USA, Inc., No. 1-
16-3366, 2017 WL 5202949 (Ill. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2017)—involve unusual circumstances. They were 
decided shortly after the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that waivers of the right to collective 
redress in employment contracts violate the NLRA. See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 
975, 989-–90 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Lewis v. Epic 
Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1155 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). The three opinions 
feature express class-arbitration waivers that were illegal under the NLRA. See Gonzalez, 2016 
WL 6427866, at *7; McElrath, 2017 WL 1175591, at *4; Mims, 2017 WL 5202949, at *1–2. Thus, 
these courts grappled with whether an arbitration clause permitted class claims after its class-
arbitration waiver had been invalidated and stricken—a bizarre form of “silence.” See McElrath, 
2017 WL 1175591, at *4 (“[E]xcising the class action waiver does not cure the . . . NLRA problem 
because . . . if the class action waiver is found unenforceable, the Agreement is silent as to whether 
Plaintiff can arbitrate on behalf of a class.”); Gonzalez, 2016 WL 6427866, at *7 (“[I]f the class 
waiver is found unenforceable, the court cannot compel arbitration of the class claims under the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen . . . .”); Mims, 2017 WL 5202949, at *5 (noting that strik-
ing the class-arbitration waiver “renders the Agreement silent as to class action proceedings and 
absent an express provision, the parties cannot submit to class action arbitration”). I nevertheless 
included both rulings, because—like the other cases in my sample—they purport to interpret the 
arbitration provision.  
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Table 1. Clause Construction: Raw Data 
 
 N 
Class 
Actions 
Allowed 
Consumer 
Cases 
Employment 
Cases 
Judge 44 2 
(4.5%) 
12 
(27.2%) 
32 
(72.7%) 
Arbitrator 106 58 (54.7%) 
39 
(36.7%) 
67 
(63.2%) 
Notes: 
The sample of judicial decisions includes the following number of 
cases from each state: California (19); Ohio (5); Illinois and Missouri 
(3 each); New York and Pennsylvania (2 each); and Alabama, 
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia (1 each). 
The sample of arbitral awards includes the following number of 
cases from each state: California (39); New York (7); Florida and 
New Jersey (5 each); Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas (4 
each); Colorado, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania (3 each); 
Georgia, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, and Washington (2 
each); Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and Vermont (1 
each). Five awards do not identify the governing jurisdiction.  
 
The gulf between judges and arbitrators comes into sharp relief 
when one compares the opinions and awards. For the tremendous ma-
jority of courts, clause construction was straightforward. These judges 
cited Stolt-Nielsen for the bright-line rule that “‘silence’ in an agree-
ment regarding class arbitration . . . indicates that it is not authorized 
by the agreement.”264 Although they acknowledged that the stipulation 
in Stolt-Nielsen meant that the contract was silent in a unique way, they 
dismissed this distinction as “split[ting] the finest of hairs.”265 Ulti-
mately, they saw no difference between a stipulation that there was “no 
 
 264. JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, No. 16-20121-CIV-GAYLES/TURNOFF, 2017 WL 3218218, at *4 
(S.D. Fla. July 28, 2017) (quoting Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 677 F. App’x 738, 741 (3d 
Cir. 2017)), vacated, 904 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Robinson v. Home Owners Mgmt. 
Enters., Inc., 549 S.W.3d 226, 241 (Tex. App. 2018) (“[B]ecause the [contract] has not one word 
about class arbitration, the trial court correctly found that the parties did not agree to arbitrate 
any claims on a classwide basis.”). 
 265. Goodale v. George S. May Int’l Co., No. 10 C 5733, 2011 WL 1337349, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
HORTON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019 2:15 PM 
1364  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1323 
agreement” about the permissibility of class actions and a clause that 
merely does not mention such procedures. In both scenarios, “[t]he re-
sult is still the same[: t]here is no ‘contractual basis’ for concluding the 
parties agreed to permit class arbitration.”266 As a federal district court 
in Pennsylvania explained, “Our analysis on this point is necessarily 
abbreviated because the jurisprudence is abundantly clear.”267 
Other judges went slightly further and bolstered their holdings 
with the contract’s text. The most common move here was to take a 
page from the Bazzle dissenters and find that language that “is written 
in the singular” means that the parties agreed to “individual or bilateral 
arbitration.”268 For instance, the Sixth Circuit observed that an arbitra-
tion clause “limits its scope to claims ‘arising out of or in connection 
with any aspect of this [a]greement,’ as opposed to other . . . [plaintiffs’] 
agreements.”269 Likewise, other provisions excluded potential class 
members by referring “to [the] plaintiff exclusively in terms of ‘I,’ ‘me,’ 
and ‘my,’ and . . . ‘differences [that] may arise between [the drafter] 
and me.’”270 
 
Apr. 5, 2011); see also Parvataneni v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (N.D. Cal. 
2013) (“While it is true that ‘failure to mention class arbitration in the arbitration clause itself 
does not necessarily equate with the “silence” discussed in Stolt-Nielsen,’ here there is simply no 
basis to conclude that the parties intended to include class arbitration in their agreement.” (quot-
ing Vasquez v. ServiceMaster Glob. Holding Inc., No. 09-cv-05148-SI, 2011 WL 2565574, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2011))). 
 266. Armenta v. Staffworks, LLC, No. 17-cv-00011-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 3118778, at *5 (S.D. 
Cal. July 21, 2017) (citation omitted). 
 267. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Ostroski, 199 F. Supp. 3d 912, 917 (M.D. Pa. 2016) 
(“Because the plain language of the arbitration clause in the Lease is silent as to class arbitration, 
we find that the Lease does not allow . . . it.”); accord AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 
543, 553 (6th Cir. 2016) (“This arbitration clause is silent on the availability of classwide arbitra-
tion, and we may not presume from ‘mere silence’ that the parties consented to it.”); Shore v. 
Johnson & Bell, No. 16-cv-4363, 2017 WL 714123, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2017) (“The plain lan-
guage of the client engagement letter is silent as to class arbitration and cannot be construed to 
provide class arbitration was intended.”); Baker v. Anytime Labor-Kan., LLC, No. 4:16-cv-00447-
RK, 2016 WL 9245464, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2016) (“[T]he [a]rbitration [a]greement is silent 
regarding class arbitration and is therefore construed as not allowing class arbitration.”); Univ. 
Toyota v. Hardeman, 228 So. 3d 394, 400 (Ala. 2017) (“Hardeman and Roberts have no right to 
engage in class-action arbitration proceedings, because the arbitration agreements they entered 
into contain no provision authorizing the arbitration of class-action claims.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 268. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-0620, 2017 WL 
1541659, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017). 
 269. AlixPartners, 836 F.3d at 553.  
 270. Martinez v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 8:14-CVcv-01481-CAS, (CWx), 2014 WL 
5604974, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014); see also Armenta, 2017 WL 3118778, at *5 (reasoning that 
“the language in the [a]greement suggests a presumption of individual arbitration” by insisting 
that conflict “between myself and [the drafter] . . . shall be submitted to and determined by bind-
ing arbitration” (emphasis and citation omitted)); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Jones, No. 
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In sharp contrast, most arbitrators held that Stolt-Nielsen did not 
control. Arbitrator after arbitrator distinguished that opinion on the 
grounds that the parties there had agreed that there was no agreement 
about whether class actions were permissible.271 Accordingly, in that 
case, “there was nothing [for the arbitrators] to construe.”272 In addi-
tion, because Oxford Health clarified that “[a]n express provision au-
thorizing class arbitration is not required,”273 arbitrators analyzed the 
contract’s language. 
The arbitral awards that allowed class actions contained two com-
mon threads. First, they cited the breadth of the arbitration clause. Ar-
bitrators were swayed by the fact that a provision covered “every pos-
sible claim,”274 “‘any dispute’ and ‘any matter in controversy,’”275 
 
C15-1176RAJ, 2016 WL 1182153, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2016) (“The agreements consist-
ently refer to the Defendants in the singular . . . .”); NCR Corp. v. Jones, 157 F. Supp. 3d 460, 467 
(W.D.N.C. 2016) (“[T]he court finds that the exclusively bilateral terms in the face of the contract 
weigh in favor of the [a]greement only covering bilateral disputes.”); Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, 
Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 930, 945 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The arbitration clause does not mention the 
possibility of class-wide arbitration, but instead focuses its scope on disputes that arise out of or 
are related to ‘services performed by the Contractor’ or the Agreement, which is specifically be-
tween Instacart and the individual Contractor.” (emphasis and citation omitted)); Herzfeld v. 
1416 Chancellor, Inc., No. 14-4966, 2015 WL 4480829, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2015) (“The . . . 
Agreement refers only to arbitration affecting ‘both parties.’ It does not mention other parties of 
any type.” (citation omitted)). 
 271. See, e.g., Clause Construction Award at 6, Grande v. Lawrence Recruiting Specialists, 
Case No. 57 160 00080 13 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Emp’t & Class Action Arbitration Tribunal 2013) 
(Christianson, Arb.) (“No such stipulation is present in this case . . . .”).  
 272. Opinion, Order and Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 8, Gonzalez v. MMM 
Healthcare, Inc., Case No. 32-187-Y-000450-12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n 2013) (Dreier, Arb.) [hereinafter 
Gonzalez Award]. 
 273. Partial Final Award on Clause Construction at 3, 9, Baer v. TruGreen Ltd. P’ship, Case 
No. 14 160 01482 12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Class Action & Emp’t Arbitration Tribunal 2013) (Feliu, 
Arb.) [hereinafter Baer Award]; see also Clause Construction Under Rule 3 of the Supplementary 
Rules for Class Arbitrations of the American Arbitration Association at 7, Guzman v. AMICO 
River Club, LLC, Case. No. 18-526-Y-000120-13 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Class & Commercial Arbitra-
tion Tribunal 2013) (Picker, Arb.) (reasoning that Stolt-Nielsen “does not stand for the proposi-
tion that an arbitration provision in a contract requires affirmative and express authorization of 
class arbitration” (emphasis omitted)) [hereinafter Guzman Award]; McCullough Award, supra 
note 232, at 9–10, (“[T]he omission of the specific words ‘class’ or ‘class action’ is not necessarily 
determinative . . . .”); Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 9–10, Her v. Club One Casino, 
Inc., Case No. 74 160 01109 12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Class Action & Emp’t Arbitration Tribunal 2013) 
(Hemminger, Arb.) (“[A]n implied agreement may be sufficient to support class arbitration.”) 
[hereinafter Her Award].”). 
 274. Partial Final Clause Construction Award of Arbitrator at 13, Price v. NCR Corp., Case 
No. 51 160 908 12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Emp’t & Class Action Arbitration Tribunal 2013) (Colflesh, 
Jr., Arb.) [hereinafter Price Award]; see also Her Award, supra note 273, at 14 (noting that the 
arbitration agreement covers “any disputes concerning the employment relationship”). 
 275. Gonzalez Award, supra note 272, at 11 (citations omitted); see also Partial Final Clause 
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“‘disputes,’ ‘claims[,]’ . . . ‘demands,’ [and] also . . . ‘proceedings,’”276 or 
“all legal and equitable claims . . . of whatever nature or kind.”277 In 
turn, they reasoned that these “comprehensive commitment[s] to arbi-
trate”278 demonstrated “that the parties agreed to submit all disputes 
to arbitration, including claims for class relief.”279 Second, several arbi-
trators faulted the company—which almost always had complete do-
minion over the contract’s terms—for not clarifying whether aggregate 
proceedings were permissible. Invoking the doctrine of contra 
proferentem, they resolved this ambiguity against the drafter.280 
 
Construction Award at 7, Harding v. Midsouth Bank, N.A., Case No. 69-516-Y-00219-12 (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n Commercial & Class Action Tribunal 2013) (Longhofer, Arb.) (“[T]he broad phrase 
‘controversy or claim’ was chosen to encompass every kind of dispute that might arise.”). 
 276. Guzman Award, supra note 273, at 10–11. 
 277. Baer Award, supra note 273, at 5. 
 278. Savaria Award, supra note 232, at 12. Similarly, arbitrators in employment cases some-
times noted that a contract incorporated the AAA Rules by reference. See McCullough Award, 
supra note 232, at 12. In turn, they observed that AAA Employment Rule 39(d) expressly permits 
the arbitrator to “grant any remedy or relief that would have been available to the parties had the 
matter been heard in court.” AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 19, RULE 39(D). Accordingly, 
“[b]ecause a class action could . . . be brought in court,” selecting the AAA Rules demonstrated 
that the contract permitted class arbitration. Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 12–13, 
Broach v. CK Franchising, Inc., Case No. 01-16-0000-2234 (Am. Arb. Ass’n 2017) (Dinneen, 
Arb.). Occasionally, arbitrators also relied on a party’s conduct, such as not objecting to a case’s 
status as a class action for years. See Her Award, supra note 273, at 17–24.  
 279. Order No. 2 Partial Final Award on the Construction of the Arbitration Clause at 4, Betts 
v. Fastfunding the Co., Case No. 33-516-00012-13 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Class & Commercial Arbitra-
tion Tribunal 2013) (Zimmerman, Arb.) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Betts Award]. Some ar-
bitrators disagreed. They noted that far-reaching language is common in arbitration clauses. See 
Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 11, Beery v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., Case No. 32 160 
00323 13 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Class Action & Emp’t Arbitration Tribunal 2014) (Hemminger, Arb.). 
Thus, “[t]o interpret such language as manifesting an intent to include class arbitration would be 
to interpret most arbitration agreements as reflecting an intent to permit class arbitrations.” Id. 
at 13. Likewise, other arbitrators who denied class status relied on the individuated language in 
the agreement. For example, they cited the fact that the contract specified that the drafter “and I 
agree to use confidential binding arbitration for any claims.” Partial Final Clause Construction 
Award at 2, 11–12, Hanna v. Pizza Hut, Inc, Case No. 33 160 00281 12 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Class 
Action Arbitration Tribunal 2013) (Sochynsky, Arb.); see also Order: Partial Final Clause Con-
struction Award, Alam v. Charter College, LLC at 3 n.1, Case No. 73 160 00378 12 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n 2013).) (Baird, Arb.) (refusing to allow class actions when the arbitration clause mentioned 
“the employee named below”). But cf. Baer Award, supra note 273, at 6 (allowing class actions 
because “[p]arty” was defined as “affected persons and/or entities,” rather than being defined “by 
name or . . . first person pronouns”).  
 280. Price Award, supra note 274, at 12 (“[T]he Agreement was entirely drafted by [the de-
fendant] and presented to [the plaintiff] as a condition of his being hired without opportunity for 
negotiation. As such, it is a contract of adhesion and must be construed against the draftsman.”); 
Betts Award, supra note 279, at 6. Likewise, in Lamps Plus, which is now pending before the 
Supreme Court, a federal district judge and the Ninth Circuit applied this logic to “find[] that the 
parties may proceed to arbitrate class claims.” Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG 
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One of the most vivid illustrations of the discrepancy between 
judges and arbitrators is the fact that they occasionally disagreed about 
whether the same contract allowed class actions. For example, in 2012 
and 2014, two separate groups of employees sued NCR Corporation, a 
Georgia software company, for allegedly violating the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act.281 NCR’s employment agreement included a short but ex-
tensive arbitration provision that “includes every possible 
claim . . . arising out of or relating in any way to my employment” with 
the intent of “allow[ing] arbitration of as many disputes as possible.”282 
In one lawsuit, a federal judge in North Carolina held that the clause 
mandated individualized arbitration.283 The court cited Stolt-Nielsen 
and observed that each employee had promised to arbitrate 
“claim[s] . . . arising out of . . . my employment”284: 
The Agreement does not mention class arbitration. Despite the fact 
that the Agreement is intended to be as broad as legally possible, [the 
employee] cannot escape the fact that the Agreement is limited to 
disputes arising out of his, and only his, employment . . . . [T]here is 
nothing in the terms of the Agreement . . . that allows this court to 
conclusively determine that the parties had an agreement or meeting 
of minds as to class arbitration, implicitly or otherwise.285 
However, the second matter against NCR ended up in arbitration. 
The arbitrator seized on different passages in the provision to reach the 
opposite conclusion: 
[The arbitration clause] cover[s] “every possible claim,” “all dis-
putes,” and is “to be interpreted broadly to allow arbitration of as 
many disputes as possible.”  
  These broad strokes clearly indicate inclusion of all claims [the em-
ployee] could have brought to court . . . . [and] cannot rationally be 
read as excluding certain actions . . . on the ground they are not spe-
cifically mentioned.286 
 
(KSx), 2016 WL 9110161, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 670 (9th Cir. 2017), 
cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1697 (2018). 
 281. See NCR Corp. v. Jones, 157 F. Supp. 3d 460, 461–62 (W.D.N.C. 2016); Price Award, 
supra note 274, at 2. 
 282. Jones, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 467. 
 283. See id. at 467–71. 
 284. Id. at 467 (emphasis added). 
 285. Id. at 470–71. 
 286. Price Award, supra note 274, at 13. Both judges and arbitrators sometimes expressed 
discomfort with the Court’s FAA jurisprudence. For example, as one Florida judge observed, 
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In sum, the parity assumption is a myth in the context of clause 
construction. Indeed, the outcome of a dispute often depends on 
whether a judge or an arbitrator presides. The next Part explains how 
this insight informs the debate over judicial and arbitral power. 
III.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Part uses my data to prescribe policy. It first suggests a solu-
tion to the conundrum over whether clause construction is a matter of 
substantive or procedural arbitrability. It then examines the related 
and unsettled issue of whether a contract can delegate power to an ar-
bitrator merely by incorporating the rules of an arbitration institution. 
A. Who Should Interpret Silent Arbitration Clauses? 
As noted, there is a massive split in authority over whether courts 
or arbitrators should engage in clause construction.287 This Section ex-
plains why the matter should presumptively be for the courts. 
Clause construction is hard to classify as either a matter of sub-
stantive or procedural arbitrability. Recall that the Court has used 
three separate approaches to make this distinction. First, Wiley’s effi-
ciency theory seeks to streamline dispute resolution.288 Initially, these 
 
prohibiting the plaintiffs from aggregating claims seemed unjust:  
The [c]ourt is mindful that its decision might have the unintended consequence of sti-
fling a claimant’s ability [to] find counsel to represent them for small claims in arbitra-
tion. Indeed, [c]laimants’ alleged losses in this action, while not frivolous, are small 
when compared to the types of awards seen in class litigation. 
JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, No. 16-20121-CIV-GAYLES/TURNOFF, 2017 WL 3218218, at *5 (S.D. Fla. 
July 28, 2017). Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that “[t]hose concerns . . . are not a basis 
for adding a term to an arbitration agreement on which the parties did not clearly agree.” Id. At 
least one arbitrator who denied class status voiced similar concerns but concluded that “reasoned 
legal argument must prevail over emotional appeal.” Opinion, Order and Partial Final Clause 
Construction Award at 10, Muhammad v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., Case No. 18-434-00804-13 (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n Commercial Arbitration & Class Action Tribunal 2014) (Dreier, Arb.).  
 287. See supra notes 231–42 and accompanying text; see also Liz Kramer, Biggest Arbitration 
Stories of 2018, ARB. NATION (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.arbitrationnation.com/biggest-arbitra-
tion-stories-2018 [https://perma.cc/XG2Q-5AZF] (noting that this circuit split “seems likely to 
pique the Justices’ interest”). As noted, the Court recently heard oral argument in Lamps Plus, 
which presents the question of “what standard a court should apply in determining whether an 
arbitration agreement authorizes class arbitration.” Transcript of Oral Argument at *3, Lamps 
Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988, 2018 WL 5447978 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2018); see also supra notes 28, 
281. However, because the parties in Lamps Plus agreed to submit the interpretation of the arbi-
tration clause to the court, the case does not raise the issue of whether clause construction is a 
matter of procedural or substantive arbitrability. See id. at *30.  
 288. See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.  
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concerns militate toward allowing arbitrators to interpret silent arbi-
tration provisions. One of the FAA’s major goals is “to move the par-
ties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly 
and easily as possible.”289 In the clause-construction context, the plain-
tiff and defendant do not dispute that they have agreed to arbitrate. 
Rather, the only source of friction is the type of proceeding to which 
they have agreed. Because the case is destined for arbitration, allowing 
the arbitrator to interpret the arbitration provision is an elegant solu-
tion that consolidates all disputes into one forum. 
However, another branch of the efficiency tree points the opposite 
way. The Wiley Court reasoned that arbitral jurisdiction should be lim-
ited to scenarios where the arbitrability issue and the underlying law-
suit arise from the same facts.290 This permits the parties to tell their 
stories once, in arbitration, rather than having to develop a record be-
fore two different decisionmakers.291 But there is no danger of parallel 
proceedings in clause construction. Indeed, putative consumer and em-
ployment class actions revolve around a defendant’s business practices, 
not the meaning of the arbitration provision. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine a topic that is less likely to overlap with the merits than filling 
the gap in a silent arbitration clause. In turn, because clause construc-
tion can be neatly compartmentalized, it can be assigned to courts with-
out squandering the parties’ resources. For these reasons, the efficiency 
theory is indeterminate. 
Alternatively, the Court has suggested that arbitrators should hear 
matters that they are better equipped than judges to decide. Bazzle, 
the Court’s initial foray into clause construction, relied heavily on this 
expertise rationale.292 As noted, the plurality and Justice Stevens cited 
the fact that arbitrators are experts in “contract interpretation and ar-
bitration procedures.”293 Since then, several courts have deemed clause 
construction to be a matter of procedural arbitrability on the grounds 
that arbitrators excel at determining the parties’ intent.294 
But my research tells a different story. Although contract inter-
pretation often hinges on trade usage and industry norms—issues that 
 
 289. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).  
 290. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.  
 291. See id.  
 292. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.  
 293. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003); id. at 454–55 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).  
 294. Jackson v. Home Team Pest Def., Inc., No. 6:13-cv-916-Orl-22TBS, 2013 WL 6051391, at 
*2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2013). 
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arbitrators are particularly good at evaluating—clause construction 
does not. Class actions invariably arise from adhesive consumer and 
employment contracts. In this milieu, there is no course of dealing for 
the arbitrator to analyze, and few plaintiffs will have even read or un-
derstood the disputed term. Therefore, as one arbitrator put it, the idea 
that the parties shared a common understanding of whether the agree-
ment authorized class arbitration “is actually a fiction.”295 
Instead, in clause construction, the dispositive issues are not fac-
tual but legal. Cases rise and fall on how the decisionmaker reconciles 
Bazzle, Stolt-Nielsen, and Oxford Health.296 There is no reason to pre-
sume that arbitrators are better than courts at navigating this doctrinal 
thicket. If anything, the opposite is true; judges tend to be more pedi-
greed than arbitrators, and they have access to top-flight law clerks. 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court once put it, “the specialized competence 
of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of 
the land.”297 Thus, seeing clause construction from the inside flips the 
conventional wisdom about which decisionmaker is best equipped to 
interpret a silent arbitration clause. 
A final factor that influences whether a question is for courts or 
arbitrators is the parties’ likely intent.298 Matters of substantive arbitra-
bility—such as determining whether the arbitration clause is valid or 
broad enough to encompass a particular dispute—are important.299 Ar-
guably, litigants prefer to resolve such topics in the judicial system, 
where they enjoy the full panoply of discovery, evidentiary, and appel-
late rights.300 
There is no consensus on how this rubric applies to clause con-
struction. Several federal appellate courts have found that interpreting 
a silent arbitration clause is crucial because there is a “fundamental 
difference” between two-party and class arbitration.301 Yet, other 
judges have observed that class actions are a mere procedural device 
 
 295. Partial Final Award on Clause Construction at 6, Chae v. W. Dental, Case No. 11 160 
424 11 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Emp’t & Class Action Arbitration Tribunal 2011) (LaMothe, Arb.).  
 296. See supra Part II.B.  
 297. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).  
 298. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. 
 299. See id.  
 300. See id.  
 301. Dell Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867, 876 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Reed Else-
vier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that matters of substantive 
arbitrability “are fundamental to the manner in which the parties will resolve their dispute,” and 
that the question “whether the parties arbitrate one claim or 1,000 in a single proceeding is no 
mere detail”). 
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that leaves the “parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of 
decision unchanged.”302 These courts have therefore held that the 
“shift from multiple bilateral arbitrations to a single class arbitration 
does nothing to alter a defendant’s potential aggregate liability.”303 
Thus, the amorphousness of the class mechanism thwarts attempts to 
apply the intent theory to clause construction. For these reasons, none 
of the Court’s tests yields a clear answer. 
Here is where my research can be helpful. It highlights a finding 
that should break the tie—the demonstrable failure of the parity as-
sumption. As noted in Part II, for clause construction, the choice be-
tween litigation and arbitration is outcome determinative.304 The odds 
are slim to none that a court will find that a silent arbitration clause 
permits class actions.305 But it is more likely than not that an arbitrator 
will reach that result.306 This belies the idea that “arbitration [is] a coe-
qual forum for dispute resolution.”307 
Of course, this apparent divergence between judges and arbitra-
tors could stem from influences that are not obvious from the raw data. 
Thus, to take a closer look, I performed a multivariate logit regression 
analysis. This technique estimates the effect of several independent 
variables on the outcome of clause construction while holding other 
variables constant.308 As Table 2 demonstrates, the odds of a class ac-
tion being permitted are 63.7 times higher when an arbitrator performs 
clause construction than when a judge resolves the matter (p = 0.000). 
 
  
 
 302. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010) (plurality 
opinion). 
 303. Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 520 (Cal. 2016). 
 304. See supra Part II.B. 
 305. See supra Part II.B. 
 306. See supra Part II.B. 
 307. Sandquist, 376 P.3d at 522.  
 308. As Table 2 elucidates, my independent variables include whether the decisionmaker is a 
court or an arbitrator, whether the plaintiff is a consumer or an employee, the jurisdiction, and 
the year of the ruling. I also conducted a regression analysis using a linear probability model, and 
the results were similar. The mere fact that an arbitrator—rather than a judge—performed clause 
construction increased the probability of class actions being permitted by 49.6 percentage points 
(p = 0.000). Rerunning the linear probability regression using the applicable state, rather than the 
court of appeals, as a control variable generated substantially similar results.  
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Table 2. Regression Analysis 
 
Outcome Variable: Class Actions Permitted 
(Logit Coefficient) 
[Odds Ratio] 
Decisionmaker† 
Arbitrator 4.154*** 
 (1.157) 
 [63.719] 
Type of Case†† 
Employment 0.439 
 (0.562) 
 [1.551] 
Jurisdiction††† 
First Circuit -0.008 
 (1.424) 
 [0.993] 
  
Second Circuit 0.513 
 (1.241) 
 [1.670] 
  
Third Circuit 1.338 
 (1.336) 
 [3.813] 
  
Fourth Circuit 0.440 
 (1.481) 
 [1.553] 
  
Fifth Circuit 1.108 
 (1.196) 
 [3.027] 
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Sixth Circuit 
 
-0.498 
 (1.556) 
 [0.608] 
  
Seventh Circuit 1.571 
 (1.654) 
 [4.811] 
  
Eighth Circuit 1.055 
 (1.350) 
 [2.871] 
  
Ninth Circuit -0.381 
 (1.031) 
 [0.683] 
  
Tenth Circuit 0.518 
 (1.663) 
 [1.678] 
  
Eleventh Circuit 0.513 
 (1.247) 
 [1.670] 
  
Constant -3.368 
 (2.175) 
 [0.034] 
  
N 150 
 
Notes: 
† The reference group for “decisionmaker” is judges. 
†† The reference group for “case type” is consumer. 
††† The reference group for “jurisdiction” is cases where the 
governing circuit is unclear. 
The regression contains dummy variables for the year of 
the decision. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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There are signs that this divergence stems from arbitrators further-
ing their own interests. First, as courts, scholars, and litigants have 
noted, arbitrators charge hundreds of dollars per hour and thus “have 
self-serving incentives to maximize the size, complexity and signifi-
cance of the matters before them.”309 Thus, it seems suspicious that ar-
bitrators are prone to authorizing long, slow, and profitable class ac-
tions. Surprisingly, even some arbitrators acknowledge the possibility 
that clause-construction awards might be tainted. Indeed, as one arbi-
trator put it, the “financial conflict of interest when arbitrators are 
vested with the jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction is a se-
rious problem.”310 Likewise, in a different award, the same arbitrator 
voiced a concern that clause construction is “fraught with financial con-
flicts of interest for the arbitrator that most in the arbitration world 
either deny or are unwilling to discuss.”311 
 
 309. Brower, supra note 24, at 51–52; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 223, at 37–38 
(arguing that arbitrators “have a direct, inevitable, and significant financial interest in decisions 
concerning the availability of class arbitration because any determination to proceed on a class 
basis will substantially increase the length and scope of the proceedings”). 
 310. Partial Final Clause Construction Award at 6 n.1, Schofield v. Delilah’s Den. of Phila., 
Inc., Case No. 03-15-0003-4601 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Commercial & Class Arbitration Tribunal 2016) 
(Matthews, Arb.). Even among arbitrators, there was a faint link between judicial experience and 
skepticism about whether a silent arbitration clause allowed class actions. 18 of the 106 clause-
construction awards were rendered by arbitrators who are retired judges. This cohort held that 
class actions were authorized 44 percent of the time. Conversely, arbitrators who are merely prac-
titioners reached the same conclusion 56.8 percent of the time (however, this difference was not 
statistically significant, p = 0.341). Although more research is necessary to explore the issue, this 
suggests that judges who become arbitrators import a different set of norms about decision-mak-
ing from their experience on the bench. One possibility is that former judges are more attuned to 
the possibility of being reversed by a higher court and thus are reluctant to read Stolt-Nielsen 
narrowly. 
Thanks to an excellent suggestion from the editors at the Duke Law Journal, I also tried to 
determine whether there was any relationship between an arbitrator’s age and the decision to 
authorize a class action. As I have noted, arbitrators have dueling incentives when they perform 
clause construction. On the one hand, they have a short-term financial interest in allowing class 
proceedings. On the other hand, doing so might scare off future business from repeat-playing 
corporate defendants. Thus, one might wonder whether older arbitrators, who are closer to re-
tirement, have fewer incentives to play the long game, and thus might be more prone to ruling in 
favor of plaintiffs. Accordingly, I googled all the arbitrators’ biographies and determined their 
approximate age at the time they issued their clause-construction orders. (For multiarbitrator 
panels, I averaged the age of the two or three decisionmakers). I discovered that the mean age of 
arbitrators who interpreted silent arbitration clauses to permit class actions, 67.8 years, was almost 
exactly the same as those who reached the opposite conclusion, 67.2 years.  
 311. Preliminary Award on Hobby’s Request to Allow Class Action (Clause Construction 
Award) at 12 n.5, In re Anthony Hobby, Case No. 11 114 01884 04 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Commercial 
& Class Action Arbitration Tribunal 2005) (Matthews, Arb.).  
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In addition, the arbitral awards allowing class actions seem results 
oriented. Recall that Stolt-Nielsen established that class arbitration is 
only permissible if the parties authorized it.312 The idea that either 
party meant to authorize class actions is far-fetched. No corporate de-
fendant would voluntarily subject itself to the specter of aggregate lia-
bility. Likewise, consumers and employees do not read fine print dis-
pute-resolution provisions.313 They are everyday people who have no 
expectations whatsoever about whether class claims are allowed. For 
these reasons, to hold that a broad arbitration clause showcases the 
parties’ mutual desire to allow class actions is to ignore the realities of 
the transaction.314 
Moreover, although there are compelling reasons to rule in favor 
of plaintiffs, Stolt-Nielsen forecloses them. First, when courts cannot 
divine the parties’ intent, they sometimes imply reasonable terms 
based on “community standards of fairness.”315 Under ordinary cir-
cumstances, this might justify an arbitral award allowing class claims. 
After all, it seems inequitable to interpret a bare arbitration clause as 
a “‘get out of jail free’ card” for corporate liability.316 Yet, even a cur-
sory reading of Stolt-Nielsen reveals that these concerns—which try to 
level the playing field between corporations and individuals—cannot 
justify an arbitral award authorizing class actions. Indeed, the Stolt-
Nielsen Court held, “[T]he task of an arbitrator is to interpret and en-
force a contract, not to make public policy.”317 
Second, a decisionmaker might penalize the company for the am-
biguity. Both before and after Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrators have often in-
voked the doctrine of contra proferentem to construe silence in a con-
tract against the drafter.318 Yet, contra proferentem “‘is not actually [a 
 
 312. See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.  
 313. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little 
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of 
Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 47 (2015) (finding that only 59 of 668 individuals (9 
percent) who read a credit card contract understood that it required the consumer to arbitrate).  
 314. See Rau, supra note 41, at 62–63 (2015) (examining a handful of arbitral clause-construc-
tion awards issued after Oxford Health, and asserting that “the putative interpretative path was 
one that would make a first year law student blush”). 
 315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 316. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding 
that adhesive class-arbitration waivers are substantively unconscionable and violate public policy 
because they deprive consumers of the ability to effectively litigate small claims and because they 
insulate corporate actors from impactful litigation of scale). 
 317. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 (2010). 
 318. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. In general, contra proferentem applies with 
special force to adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Tahoe Nat’l Bank v. Phillips, 480 P.2d 320, 327 (Cal. 
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rule] of interpretation’ as ‘its application does not assist in determining 
the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or even the mean-
ing that a reasonable person would have assigned to the language 
used.’”319 Instead, it is a policy-driven attempt to “favor[] the under-
dog.”320 Accordingly, there is no meaningful difference between arbi-
tral awards based on this doctrine and the improper arbitral award in 
Stolt-Nielsen.321 
These dark glimmers of arbitral bias suggest that clause construc-
tion should be for the courts. None of the Court’s arbitrability touch-
stones support entrusting an issue to an unreliable decisionmaker. 
First, questionable rulings are the polar opposite of efficient. Indeed, 
as cases like Oxford Health illustrate, a shaky award may generate 
years of appeals.322 Second, it is antithetical to the expertise theory to 
allow arbitrators to interpret silent arbitration clauses when some of 
them cannot do so evenhandedly. Finally, as a general principle, the 
parties would probably prefer to avoid erratic decisions on any topic. 
Therefore, presuming that they would want to roll the dice in arbitra-
tion does violence to their likely intent. 
To be sure, this conclusion is a blow for consumers and employees 
who have benefitted from ad hoc arbitral clause-construction awards. 
However, as discussed in the next Subsection, my findings cut the other 
way on another important topic.323 
 
1971) (“Since the alleged ambiguities appear in a standardized contract, drafted and selected by 
the bank, which occupies the superior bargaining position, those ambiguities must be interpreted 
against the bank.”); see David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard 
Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 440–46 (2009) (collecting pre-Stolt-Nielsen cases that 
invoke contra proferentem). 
 319. Catlin Speciality Ins. v. QA3 Fin. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 336, 342 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (quoting 
5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN & MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (rev. ed. 
1998)).  
 320. CORBIN & KNIFFIN, supra note 319, § 24.27; see also Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and 
the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 475 (2011) (“The one thing 
that this ‘rule’ is not, clearly, is an interpretive guide aimed at ferreting out what the true ‘inten-
tion’ or ‘meaning’ of the parties truly was.”). 
 321. See, e.g., Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 41, at 1154 (“[C]onstruing the agreement 
against the party that drafted it . . . pretty clearly would not be sufficient to satisfy the standard 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen.”).  
 322. See supra notes 217–28 and accompanying text.  
 323. The unreliable nature of the arbitral clause-construction rulings also cast doubt on the 
wisdom of the Court’s recent decision in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. 
Ct. 524, 531 (2019); see also supra note 92; infra note 339. Archer and White and a company that 
eventually became Henry Schein entered into a distribution contract that delegated arbitrability 
to the arbitrator and excluded “actions seeking injunctive relief.” Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. 
Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 524. Archer 
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B. “Ghost” Delegation Clauses 
First Options requires parties to “clearly and unmistakably” con-
vey their intent to allow arbitrators to decide matters of substantive 
arbitrability.324 Yet, some courts have held that agreements can achieve 
this result without express delegation clauses. This Subsection criticizes 
that approach.325 
Drafters often declare that arbitration must proceed under the in-
ternal regulations of a specific dispute-resolution service, such as the 
AAA or Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”).326 
Both institutions instruct arbitrators in potential class actions to “de-
termine as a threshold matter whether the arbitration can proceed on 
behalf of or against a class.”327 Likewise, they allow arbitrators to re-
solve “any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of 
the arbitration agreement.”328 Jurisdictions are divided over whether a 
 
and White then sued Henry Schein, seeking damages and an injunction. See id. Henry Schein 
responding by arguing that the arbitrator should decide whether the carve-out for “injunctive 
relief” applied. See id. at 490–91. The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the delegation provision, 
holding that any argument that a request for an injunction fell within the scope of the arbitration 
clause was “wholly groundless.” See id. at 494–97. However, the Court granted certiorari and 
eliminated the “wholly groundless” exception. See Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531. The Court 
observed that the FAA “does not contain a ‘wholly groundless’ exception.” Id. at 528. In addition, 
the Court voiced concern that “[t]he exception would inevitably spark collateral litigation (with 
briefing, argument, and opinion writing) over whether a seemingly unmeritorious argument for 
arbitration is wholly groundless, as opposed to groundless.” Id. at 531. Finally, in an odd passage, 
the Court seemed to inch back from the parity assumption:  
Archer and White further assumes that an arbitrator would inevitably reject arbitration 
in those cases where a judge would conclude that the argument for arbitration is wholly 
groundless. Not always. After all, an arbitrator might hold a different view of the arbi-
trability issue than a court does, even if the court finds the answer obvious. It is not 
unheard-of for one fair-minded adjudicator to think a decision is obvious in one direc-
tion but for another fair-minded adjudicator to decide the matter the other way. 
Id. This may be truer than the Court knows. If the clause-construction rulings are any indication, 
arbitrators and judges likely see scope arbitrability very differently. By permitting arbitrators to 
resolve wholly groundless assertions that a claim falls within the ambit of an arbitration clause, 
Henry Schein opens the door for rogue arbitral rulings.  
 324. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text.  
 325. These arguments are intended to supplement Horton, supra note 13. In that piece, I draw 
similar conclusions based on (1) the historical difference between arbitration about the merits of 
a lawsuit and arbitration about the arbitrability of a lawsuit, (2) the text and legislative history of 
the FAA, and (3) prudential considerations. See id. at 399–413. 
 326. See, e.g., Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring arbitra-
tion to be conducted “in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association”); 
Gould v. Japan Pulp & Paper (U.S.A.), No. 14 Civ. 7905, 2015 WL 631405, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
13, 2015) (“The Parties agree to submit any dispute, controversy or claim . . . to final and binding 
arbitration under the [JAMS] Commercial Arbitration Rules . . . .” (alteration in original)). 
 327. JAMS, supra note 181, RULE 2; AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 40, RULE 3. 
 328. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES r. 14(a) (2016), 
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contract that merely opts into AAA or JAMS rules thereby incorpo-
rates them, creating a “ghost” delegation clause. 
This dilemma transcends the traditional battle lines between 
plaintiffs and defendants. When the arbitrability issue is clause con-
struction, corporations argue that an oblique reference to AAA or 
JAMS rules cannot satisfy the test from First Options.329 Courts are 
split. The Fifth Circuit and judges in California, Florida, New York, 
and Texas have found that selecting AAA or JAMS rules “delegate[s] 
the issue of class arbitration to the arbitrator.”330 But other courts have 
refused to indulge in what the Third Circuit called “a daisy-chain of 
cross-references.”331 Instead, they demand a conventional delegation 
 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MQA-SRAX] 
(permitting an arbitrator to resolve “any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity 
of the arbitration agreement”); AM. ARB. ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND 
MEDIATION PROCEDURES RULE 6(A) (2009), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employ-
ment%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZZ9-5VPP] (same); JAMS, JAMS COMPREHENSIVE 
ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES RULE 11(B) (2014).), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Up-
loads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YCB3-L59V] (granting the arbitrator jurisdiction over “disputes over the formation, 
existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement”).  
 329. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. Iversen, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting 
Yahoo’s position, and agreeing with the plaintiff that incorporating the AAA supplementary rules 
constituted an agreement to let the arbitrator decide class-arbitrability questions). 
 330. Langston v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 203 F. Supp. 3d 777, 789 (S.D. Tex. 2016); 
accord Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 635–36 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The parties’ consent 
to the [s]upplementary [r]ules . . . constitutes a clear agreement to allow the arbitrator to decide 
whether [the] agreement provides for class arbitration.”), abrogated on other grounds by Oxford 
Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, No. 17-cv-61086-
BLOOM/Valle, 2017 WL 4155476, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2017) (same); Guess?, Inc. v. Rusell, 
No. 2:16-cv-00780-CAS(ASx), 2016 WL 2644297, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2016) (same); Castaldi 
v. Signature Retail Servs., Inc., No. 15-cv-00737-JSC, 2016 WL 74640, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 
2016) (same); cf. Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C. v. Tucker, 195 F. Supp. 3d 543, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(citing a contract’s incorporation AAA Securities Arbitration Rules, which allow arbitrators to 
hear challenges to their own jurisdiction, as additional evidence that “the arbitrator, rather than 
the [c]ourt, should determine the availability of classwide arbitration in the first instance,” but 
declining to find that the delegation was clear and unmistakable). 
 331. See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 761 (3d Cir. 
2016) (citation omitted) (holding that a bare reference to “the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association” is insufficient to delegate clause construction to the arbitrator (quotations omitted)); 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that a contract that 
mandated “binding arbitration under . . . the then-current [c]ommercial [r]ules and supervision of 
the American Arbitration Association . . . does not mention classwide arbitration at all”); Her-
zfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 14-4966, 2015 WL 4480829, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2015), aff’d, 666 
F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e cannot find the three-word reference to AAA ‘rules and reg-
ulations’ incorporates a panoply of collective and class action rules . . . .”); Shakoor v. VXI Glob. 
Sols., 35 N.E.3d 539, 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (“Although the AAA rules are referenced in gen-
eral that is not sufficient to conclude that the parties agreed the arbitrator was authorized to de-
termine if the agreement permits class arbitration.”).  
HORTON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019 2:15 PM 
2019] CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION 1379 
clause in order “to wrest that decision from the courts.”332 On the other 
hand, when the arbitrability issue is unconscionability, plaintiffs assert 
that delegation provisions must be explicit.333 Most courts have rejected 
this argument when both parties are sophisticated.334 Likewise, some 
judges have enforced ghost delegation clauses in adhesion contracts, 
including employment agreements,335 video game subscriptions,336 and 
payday loans.337 But others have objected that “incorporating forty 
pages of arbitration rules into an arbitration clause is tantamount to 
inserting boilerplate inside of boilerplate”; these judges have held that 
mentioning an arbitration provider’s policies in the fine print is not a 
“clear and unmistakable” delegation of power.338 Accordingly, “the im-
pact of incorporating the AAA’s [or JAMS’s] model rules . . . appears 
far from clear.”339 
 
 332. Bird v. Turner, No. 5:14CV97, 2015 WL 5168575, at *8 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 1, 2015) (quot-
ing Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599).  
 333. See, e.g.,  Plaintiff’s Opposition to Redfin’s Second Motion to Compel Arbitration at 4, 
Galen v. Redfin, Co., No. 3:14-cv-05229 THE, 2015 WL 10719009 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2015). 
 334. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013); Petrofac, 
Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); Qualcomm 
Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. 
P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol. Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 
(2d Cir. 2005).   
 335. See, e.g., Mercadante v. XE Servs., LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding 
that the parties in an employment agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated arbitrability to 
an arbitrator); Howard v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-103, 2010 WL 3009515, at *4 (E.D. 
Tenn. July 28, 2010) (same); Anderson v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. C 04-4808 SBA, 2005 WL 
1048700, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2005) (same); cf. Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1131 
(9th Cir. 2015) (holding that incorporating AAA Employment Rules was a clear and unmistaka-
ble delegation in an employment contract between a bank and an executive).  
 336. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Microsoft Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00316–MJP, 2014 WL 4540225, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (granting a motion to compel arbitration based on the Terms of Use 
of Xbox LIVE).  
 337. Bernal v. Sw. & Pac. Specialty Fin., Inc., No. C 12-05797 SBA, 2014 WL 1868787, at *1, 
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2014). 
 338. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toll Bros., 171 F. Supp. 3d 417, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citation omitted); 
see also Meadows v. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests. Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(distinguishing between incorporation of AAA rules in a contract between sophisticated parties 
and an agreement for consumers); Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 
WL 2903752, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (same); Glob. Client Sols., LLC v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 
361, 369 (Mont. 2016) (same). 
 339. Minutes of Motion Hearing at 9, Guess?, Inc. v. Russel, No. 2:16-cv-00780-CAS(ASx) 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016). This issue lurked in the background of Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & 
White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 531 (2019). As mentioned supra notes 92 and 324, Henry Schein 
held that there is no “wholly groundless” exception to delegation provisions. See id. However, the 
contract in that case did not contain an express delegation clause; instead, it merely selected the 
AAA Rules. See Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 878 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 
2017), vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019). The lower courts did not conclusively resolve 
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My analysis casts doubt on the wisdom of honoring ghost delega-
tion clauses. For starters, in the clause-construction context, the differ-
ence in outcomes is so pronounced that it is perverse to link the choice 
of decisionmaker to a stray reference to the AAA or JAMS. Any rule 
that would blithely enlarge arbitral power over this topic is exactly 
backward. 
By the same token, incorporating an institution’s rules in an adhe-
sion contract should not be enough to compel arbitration of uncon-
scionability challenges. Admittedly, unlike clause construction, I have 
no evidence that arbitrators diverge from courts when they decide 
whether an arbitration clause is unfair. However, there are several sim-
ilarities between clause construction and unconscionability. For one, 
each issue involves a question that is linked to an arbitrator’s compen-
sation. Indeed, if an arbitrator finds that the arbitration clause is unen-
forceable, she passes up an opportunity to charge thousands of dollars 
for deciding the merits. Also, as is the case with the interpretation of a 
silent arbitration clause, the question whether a provision is uncon-
scionable gives the decisionmaker tremendous discretion. After all, 
“[u]nconscionability is an amorphous concept that evades precise def-
inition.”340 As a result, it imposes few constraints on arbitrators who 
are hell-bent on deciding that the case must go on. 
In fact, arbitral bias may be even more pronounced when the issue 
is the validity of the arbitration clause. Some arbitrators skew their 
clause-construction awards even though there are unique downsides to 
engaging in such conduct. For example, clause-construction rulings are 
published. Thus, an arbitrator who writes a disingenuous award gam-
bles with her reputation. But there is no such check on unconscionabil-
ity awards, which (like most awards) remain private. This privacy might 
 
whether incorporating the AAA rules functioned as a ghost delegation clause. See id. at 494–97. 
When the matter reached the Court, George A. Bermann, the chief reporter for the American 
Law Institute’s Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Ar-
bitration, filed an amicus brief explaining why the opinions that recognize ghost delegation 
clauses are “incorrectly decided.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor George A. Bermann in Sup-
port of Respondent at 2, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct 524 (2019). 
According to Bermann, the arbitration-institution rules that courts have interpreted to be dele-
gation clauses were not intended to strip courts of jurisdiction over arbitrability; rather, they 
merely permit arbitrators to decide those matters. See id. at 11. At oral argument, this theory 
piqued the interest of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *8–9, 
*49–50, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (No. 17-1272). 
Likewise, Justice Kavanagh’s opinion concluded by “express[ing] no view about whether the con-
tract at issue in this case in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.” Henry 
Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531. Accordingly, at least some Justices are skeptical about ghost delegations. 
 340. Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 164 (Wis. 2006). 
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provide a smoke screen for arbitrators who are guided by money. In 
addition, in the clause-construction milieu, arbitrators’ short-term in-
terests arguably differ from their long-term goals. Although a pro-
plaintiff ruling pays dividends immediately by christening an expensive 
class action, it also could reduce the chances that a repeat-playing cor-
poration will choose the arbitrator in the future. Therefore, even the 
most entrepreneurial arbitrator faces a conflict. Conversely, in uncon-
scionability cases, both of these arrows point in the same direction. 
Ruling that the arbitration clause is enforceable both allows the arbi-
tration to proceed and sends a pro-defendant signal. Thus, even if the 
arbitral process is unfair, and no matter what a court might hold, arbi-
trators are unlikely to exempt matters from arbitration.341 
For these reasons, it is important that judges retain as much power 
as possible over unconscionability. To achieve this goal, courts should 
not enforce ghost delegation clauses in adhesion contracts. If a drafter 
wants to arm arbitrators with the power to decide whether the arbitral 
process is fair, she should be required to do so explicitly. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, the Supreme Court has insisted that arbitrating, ra-
ther than litigating, does not impact the outcome of a case. This Article 
 
 341. A lurking, related issue is whether arbitrators can decide the mother of all gateway ques-
tions—whether the FAA even applies. Section 1 of the FAA excludes employment contracts in-
volving “transportation workers.” See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
Likewise, section 2 requires an arbitration clause to be nested within “a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. In addition, federal lawmakers have passed several 
regulations that override the FAA. For example, Congress prohibits arbitration clauses in certain 
residential mortgages and loans made to members of the armed services. See Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1414, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 
Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 987(e)(3) (2006); Horton, supra note 13, at 435–39 (collecting 
more examples); David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 MINN. L. REV. 665, 684–87 & n.110 
(2018) (same). Can delegation clauses allow arbitrators to rule on whether these antiarbitration 
rules apply?  
As this Article was being edited, the Court filled in one piece of the puzzle by holding that 
arbitrators cannot determine whether an agreement qualifies for section 1’s carve-out for employ-
ment contracts involving transportation workers. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 
534 (2019). The Court reached that result by focusing on the statute’s text and structure, reasoning 
that “to invoke its statutory powers under §§ 3 and 4 to stay litigation and compel arbitration 
according to a contract’s terms, a court must first know whether the contract itself falls within or 
beyond the boundaries of §§ 1 and 2.” Id. Because of this laser-like focus on the FAA, New Prime 
does not speak to whether external antiarbitration laws—such as federal bans on arbitration 
clauses in certain transactions—are delegable. My research suggests that there should be a thumb 
on the scale against allowing arbitrators to decide matters that determine whether the arbitration 
goes forward.  
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demonstrates that in one context—disputes over whether a silent arbi-
tration clause allows class actions—the parity assumption is a fallacy. 
Even controlling for other variables, arbitrators are 63.7 times more 
likely than judges to interpret the provision as permitting class pro-
ceedings. Moreover, this Article presents circumstantial evidence that 
this disparity stems from arbitrators furthering their financial interests. 
By limiting arbitral jurisdiction over similar issues, the legal system can 
maintain the integrity of private dispute resolution. 
